Showing posts with label Maimonides. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Maimonides. Show all posts

Thursday, July 11, 2013

Devarim - "How Can I Alone Carry Your Trouble, Your Burden, and Your Disputes?"

Parhas Devarim begins with the first of Moses' parting addresses to the Jewish people, in which he reviews their history and rebukes them - often in veiled terms - for their misdeeds. Early in the speech, Moses speaks of how he came to appoint judges over the people  (as told in Exodus 18). Here too, Moses engages in veiled rebuke. While Moses begins by stating that the reason who could not judge them alone was due to their numbers, and he blesses them that they should continue to increase, he then goes on to indicate that the need for additional judges was also due to less positive issues as well, stating (Deuteronomy 1:12):
איכה אשא לבדי טרחכם ומשאכם וריבכם:
"How can I alone carry your trouble, your burden, and your disputes?"
On a purely peshat (basic text) level, this verse could be interpreted as simply expanding on the idea that, as a numerous and growing nation, there was simply too many issues for one person, even Moses, to handle alone. However, asides from the fact that this would be repetitious, the terms used by the verse clearly carry a somewhat critical tone. In fact, Rashi, quoting the Sages (Sifri), understands these three terms to refer to veiled criticisms, and explains each in the context of Moses' role as a judge:
טרחכם. מלמד שהיו ישראל טרחנין, היה אחד מהם רואה את בעל דינו נוצח בדין, אומר יש לי עדים להביא, יש לי ראיות להביא, מוסיף אני עליכם דיינין:

ומשאכם. מלמד שהיו אפיקורסין, הקדים משה לצאת, אמרו מה ראה בן עמרם לצאת, שמא אינו שפוי בתוך ביתו, איחר לצאת, אמרו מה ראה בן עמרם שלא לצאת, מה אתם סבורים, יושב ויועץ עליכם עצות וחושב עליכם מחשבות:

וריבכם. מלמד שהיו רוגנים:
"Your trouble" - This teaches that [the children of] Israel were burdensome. If one would see that his opponent in court was winning, he would say, "I have witnesses to bring," "I have proofs to bring," "I am adding on judges to you." (See Ramban for a halachic  explanation of the latter.)
"Your burden" - This teaches that they were apikorsin (heretics). If Moses went out early [to judge cases] they would say, "Why did Ben Amram leave [home early]? Perhaps things are not going smoothly at home." If he would delay leaving [home] they would say, "What do you think? He is sitting and getting advice [from his wife (Sifri)] against you, and thinking thoughts against you."
"And your disputes" - This teaches that they were quarrelsome.
Each of these commentaries deserves extended discussion. On the most basic level, Moses was pointing out three problem areas among the Jewish people that made it particularly difficult to judge them.

The first problem was that judging cases between two Jews was exceptionally burdensome because each one was so determined to win that they would drag the case out far beyond reason and would take advantage of every possible technicality. It is important to note that Moses does not accuse them of actually engaging in any kind of dishonesty or violation of the rules but of an excessive drive to win which placed an undue burden on the judge. This behavior indicated that the litigants were motivated less by a desire for justice than by a desire to be victorious over their fellow.

The second problem was that the Jews would interpret any behavior of the judge, even outside of the court, as evidence that he was not judging their case properly. Thus, if he came early, "Uh oh! Must be problems at home! We better watch out!" And if he came late, "Uh oh! He must have been talking over the case with his wife! Who knows what she told him?"

It is significant that the Sages considered those who engaged in this behavior not simply as burdensome, but actually as apikorsim - a term usually translated as "heretics." This is because, contrary to what is commonly assumed, the category of apikoros -  "heretic" - does not refer only to one who does not accept the doctrines of Judaism, but also to one who shows disrespect for the Torah or its scholars. Maimonides writes (Commentary on the Mishna, Sanhedrin 10:1):
ומלת אפיקורוס היא ארמית, ענינה מי שמפקיר ומבזה את התורה או לומדיה, ולפיכך קורין בזה השם כל שאינו מאמין ביסודי התורה או מי שמבזה החכמים או איזה תלמיד חכם שיהיה או המבזה רבו:
The word apikoros is Aramaic, and it refers to one who devalues or disparages the Torah or those who study it. The term is therefore used for anyone who does not believe in the fundamental principles of the Torah, or one who disparages the Sages or any other Torah scholar, or one who disparages his teacher.
To disparage a Torah scholar is to disparage the Torah itself, which is the entire foundation of Judaism. Thus, these Jews who spoke disparagingly of Moses were indeed apikorsim.

The third problem was that they were quarrelsome, i.e. they would engage in unnecessary and unproductive disputes. The Sages (Sifri) describe this as, "they would spend a selah (an ancient coin) to take two selaim, and they would spend two selaim to take three selaim." At first glance this would seem perfectly reasonable, after all, you need to spend money to make money. However, the repetition - one for two, two for three - indicates that what we are talking about here is that they would spend extra money in order to make their opponent pay extra money, even though they would walk away with the same amount of profit. (ראה עמק הנצי"ב) This, like the first problem, was rooted in an inappropriate desire to be victorious over their fellow, even when they didn't stand to gain anything.

The midrash (Eicha Raba 1:1) tells us that there were three prophets who prophesied using the term "eicha," Moses (in this verse), Isaiah (1:21, which we read in the haftara for Parshas Devarim), and Jeremiah (in Eicha - Lamentations). (We have discussed this midrash previously.) This would seem to indicate that there is some continuity between the themes discussed in these verses.

While this topic deserves a fuller exploration than I'm prepared to attempt at this time, the basic idea - that these problems are closely related to the sins that led to the destruction of the Second Temple and the exile of the Jewish from their land - is fairly straightforward.

The Talmud (Bava Metzia 30b) tells us:
דאמר רבי יוחנן: לא חרבה ירושלים אלא על ... שהעמידו דיניהם על דין תורה, ולא עבדו לפנים משורת הדין.
Rabbi Yochanan said, Jerusalem was not destroyed except because they decided their cases according to Torah law, and they did not go beyond the limits of the law.
The issue that Rabbi Yochanan is describing is precisely the issue that we described above as the first and third problem that Moses was describing. We can readily see how such problems are related to the more basic issue of sinas chinam (unjustified hatred) which, the Talmud (Yoma 9b) tells us, was the primary cause of the destruction of the Second Temple.

With regard to the second problem we discussed - i.e. the disrespect for Torah scholars we also find a directly parallel statement in the Talmud (Shabbos 119b):
אמר רבי יהודה: לא חרבה ירושלים אלא בשביל שביזו בה תלמידי חכמים
Rabbi Yehuda said, Jerusalem was not destroyed except because they disparaged Torah scholars.
We see here that disrespect for Torah scholars was one of the main contributing causes of the destruction of the Temple and the exile of the Jewish people. This is closely connected to the famous Talmudic passage in Nedarim 81a that the reason the land was lost was "שלא ברכו בתורה תחילה" - "because they failed to recite the blessing on the Torah [before study]." As the commentaries (ר"ן בשם ר' יונה, ומשנה ברורה ס' מ"ז) explain that even though the Jewish people were studying Torah, they didn't properly appreciate the unique status of the Torah over and above all other wisdom. Torah that is studied without a proper appreciation of its significance is not truly Torah at all. Fundamentally, the failure to give the proper respect to Torah scholars is rooted in the failure to truly appreciate the Torah itself.

At this time of year, when we are in mourning over the destruction of our Holy Temples, it particularly appropriate for us to meditate upon the root causes of our exile, which is ultimately the root cause of all the tragedies and suffering of history. By carefully studying our own behavior and attitudes, and working to bring them in line with the teachings of the Torah, we will ultimately merit the coming of the Messiah and the rebuilding of the Holy Temple in Jerusalem. May it happen soon in our days!

Friday, May 24, 2013

Beha'aloscha - The Sin of Miriam

At the end of Parshas Beha'aloscha (Numbers 12), we read of the incident in which Miriam is punished with tzaraas for the sin of speaking lashon hara (harmful speech) of her younger brother, Moses. (See our previous discussion of this incident.) This incident is of such significance that it is the subject of a special obligation, as stated in Deuteronomy 24:9:
זכור את אשר עשה ה' אלקיך למרים בדרך בצאתכם ממצרים:
“Remember what Hashem your God did to Miriam when you were on the road when you left Egypt.”
Maimonides
Towards the end of his discussion of the laws of tzaraas (Hil. Tumas Tzaraas 16:10), Maimonides explains that the primary function of tzaraas was as a "sign and wonder in Israel to warn them against lashon hara." He then makes reference to the mitzva to remember the incident of Miriam and explains:
The Torah is telling us to think deeply upon what happened to the prophetess Miriam, who spoke about her brother. For she was older than him, and she had raised him [as a child] and had endangered herself to save him from the [river], and she did not speak derogatorily of him, but simply erred in equating him to to other prophets. {Furthermore, Moses] had no objection to any of these words, as it says [in the account of the incident] (Numbers 12:3), "and the man, Moses, was very humble." And, despite all of this, she was immediately punished with tzaraas! [If even in such a case, God was so strict with regard to the sin of lashon hara, then] all the more so with regard to those foolish and wicked men who talk excessively of great and wondrous matters [i.e. they speak disparagingly of the righteous and the prophets]!
Thus, we have a special obligation to remember what happened to Miriam, and from recalling that incident, we should recognize the great severity of the sin of lashon hara. Indeed, the mere fact that there is such a mitzva is itself a matter of great significance. As the Pele Yo'etz (R' Eliezer Papo, d.1824) points out (ערך זכרונות), lashon hara is the only prohibition with such an obligation associated with it.

While the severity of the sin of lashon hara is well known and is heavily emphasized throughout all traditional Torah works, the reason for this severity is less clear. On the simplest level, one of the reasons why the severity of lashon hara is so heavily emphasized is precisely because it is a sin that is often overlooked as insignificant. While we readily recognize the severity of crimes such as murder, robbery, or even simply striking another person, and we would not hesitate to condemn someone who engages in such behavior,   when it comes to lashon hara our moral awareness often seems to be diminished. Thus, the Torah must go out of its way to emphasize, and reemphasize, over and over, the severity of this sin, and to stress that it truly is in the same moral category as murder and robbery.

Moreover, asides from the obvious moral issues involved in lashon hara, there are sources that tell us that the severity of lashon hara is rooted in the spiritual significance of the power of human speech. R' Levi Yitzchak of Berdichov (d.1809) writes (פי' נחמד על הזכירות) that the the human power of speech is a special gift from God that distinguishes us from the animals. The true purpose of this gift is for us to use it for spiritual purposes, especially the study of Torah and prayer. To, God forbid, take this Divine, spiritual gift and use it to speak lashon hara or falsehoods or any of the other sins involving speech, is therefore a basic corruption of our spiritual status as human beings.

Friday, April 19, 2013

Acharei Mos-Kedoshim - The Laws of Sexual Morality: When a Mishpat Appears to be a Chok

The latter portion of parshas Acharei Mos is a list of the various sexual prohibitions. Before it begins the list, the Torah provides an introductory paragraph (Leviticus 18:1-5), which, in five brief sentences, covers several significant themes:
וידבר ה' אל משה לאמר: דבר אל בני ישראל ואמרת אלהם אני ה' אלקיכם: כמעשה ארץ מצרים אשר ישבתם בה לא תעשו וכמעשה ארץ כנען אשר אני מביא אתכם שמה לא תעשו ובחקתיהם לא תלכו: את משפטי תעשו ואת חקתי תשמרו ללכת בהם אני ה' אלקיכם: ושמרתם את חקתי ואת משפטי אשר יעשה אתם האדם וחי בהם אני ה':
And God spoke to Moses, saying: Speak to the children of Israel, and say to them: I am Hashem your God. You shall not do the actions of the land of Egypt, in which you lived, and you shall not do the actions of the land of Canaan, to which I am bringing you, and you shall not walk in their ways. My laws (mishpatim) you shall do, and My decrees (chukim) you shall keep, to walk in them; I am Hashem your God. You shall keep My decrees and My laws, for a man shall do them and live by them, I am God.
While we can readily understand why the Torah would stress the importance of not imitating the ways of the Egyptians and Canaanite nations in its introduction to the sexual prohibitions, there are a number of less obvious themes stressed in this paragraph which require explanation.

Perhaps the most obvious is the repeated emphasis on the identity of God as the Commander of these laws. This, of course, is one of the most basic themes of the entire Torah, but why would it require special emphasis at this point?

Another theme that is strongly emphasized is the division of mitzvos into the categories of mishpatim and chukim - i.e. laws that, even if God had not commanded them, we would have needed to establish on our own, and laws which we only know by virtue of Divine revelation. According to the Sages (Yoma 67b and Sifra here), the laws of sexual morality are counted among the mishpatim - the laws accessible to reason - and there doesn't appear to be any obvious reason why the Torah should specifically emphasize this theme at this particular point.

I believe the Torah is actually making an extremely important point in this passage, and one that is of particular relevance to us today. The ultimate authority of all the mitzvos is the fact that they are commanded to us by God. Even though we are often able to recognize the necessity of a given mitzva based on our own understanding, we must never lose sight of the fact that the authority of the mitzvos does not depend on our comprehension of their purpose.

The categories of mishpatim and chukim are categories that exist only from a human perspective. Those laws which we are capable of comprehending are mishpatim, and those laws which we are not capable of comprehending are chukim. From God's perspective, however, there is obviously no such division.

Of course, as with all things, the ability to comprehend the mitzvos will vary from person to person. A mitzva that might be self-evident to one person may well be a total mystery to another. Perhaps even more importantly, mitzvos that might seem self-evident in one culture may be utterly incomprehensible in another.

While this can be seen in many areas, in no area is this more clear than when it comes to sexual morality. As we all know, different cultures often have radically different views on this subject. Moreover, as we have seen in the last century, even within a specific culture attitudes towards sexual morality can undergo radical change in a remarkably short period of time.

The Torah therefore goes out of its way to emphasize, in introducing these laws, that we must never forget Who gave us these laws, and that His laws are not dependent on our comprehension, and they do not change depending on the norms of the people around us. Whether we see these laws - or any specific aspect of these laws - as a mishpat or as a chok, we remain fully obligated to obey them.

To take this a step further, I believe there is an even deeper message in these passages. In the fourth verse of the introduction, the Torah tells us, "את משפטי תעשו ואת חקתי תשמרו ללכת בהם" - "My laws you shall do, and My decrees you shall keep, to walk in them." The words, "to walk in them," appear to be unnecessary and superfluous. The Sages (Sifra here, also cited by Rashi) explain that these words are actually referring to Torah study:
ללכת בהם עשם עיקר ואל תעשם טפלה. ללכת בהם שלא יהא משאך ומתנך אלא בהם שלא תערב בהם דברים אחרים בעולם. שלא תאמר למדתי חכמת ישראל אלמוד חכמת אומות העולם תלמוד לומר ללכת בהם אינך ראשי ליפטר מתוכן
"To walk in them" - Make them primary and not secondary.
"To walk in them" - Your discourse should be exclusively in them and you shall not intermingle other worldly matters with them.
A person should not say, "I have studied the wisdom of Israel, [and now] I shall study the wisdom of the nations of the world," for the Torah says, "To walk in them" - you are not authorized to take leave from them.
The Sages understand these words to be teaching us of the importance and primacy of Torah study, and, in particular, of the importance of not intermingling and equating the study of worldly knowledge or foreign wisdom with the Torah. While this is certainly an important basic concept, once again we have to explain why the Torah chose to stress this topic at this particular point.

To answer this question, I believe we need to return to our previous discussion on the categories of chok and mishpat. Based on what we said above - that the categories of mishpatim and chukim only exist from a human perspective, and that different people will often have very different perspectives on whether a given law is a mishpat or a chok - one might come to the conclusion that the distinction between mishpatim and chukim is entirely subjective. After all, as we just pointed out, there is no real difference between a chok and a mishpat. In either case, our obligation is the same. (Although there may be a difference with regards to perfecting our character, as Maimonides explains in chapter six of his Shemoneh Perakim.)

Nevertheless, the Torah strongly implies that these are actually objective categories. The Torah specifically refers to certain laws as mishpatim and others as chukim. Similarly, the Sages list specific commandments in each category (although there is no comprehensive list categorizing all of the mitzvos). This tells us that mishpatim are not simply those mitzvos that we happen to understand, but those mitzvos that a properly thinking human being will recognize as necessary. If the Torah and Sages categorize a given mitzva as a mishpat, then it is an error to categorize as as a chok, even if we find it incomprehensible. The fact that we find the mitzva incomprehensible, even though the Torah and the Sages say that it is a mishpat, indicates that, on some level, we are not thinking properly.

The failure to be able to properly recognize a mishpat as a mishpat is therefore indicative of a more basic flaw in our mental and spiritual state. As a general rule, the primary cause of such a flaw is the influence of our surrounding environment. As Maimondes writes (Hil. Deos 6:1), "it is the way of human nature for a person to be drawn, in his thoughts and deeds, after his neighbors and friends, and to behave in the manner of the people of his country."

It is for this reason that, specifically with regard to this topic, where the influence of the surrounding culture is particularly powerful, that the Torah emphasizes the importance of studying Torah - pure Torah - for it is only in this way that we can hope to overcome the influence of the surrounding culture so that we can recognize the self-evident immorality of behavior that, in the surrounding society, is seen as perfectly innocuous or even virtuous.

From this we can see that, as important as Torah study always is, to the degree that the surrounding environment becomes morally corrupt, especially with regard to sexual immorality, the more important it is for a Jew to focus on studying Torah with exclusive focus. I once heard in the name of Rav Yitzchak Hutner that in previous generations, a yeshiva was like the mishkan (Tabernacle) in the Jewish camp in the wilderness, for the entire community was a place of holiness and fear of God, and the yeshiva was simply a place of exceptional holiness. In our generation, however, Rav Hutner said that the yeshiva is like Noah's ark, for the outside world is flooded with explicit immorality, and the only place of shelter is within the walls of the yeshiva.

We live today in a time of extraordinary challenge for a Jew, in which the outside world appears to beckon welcomingly, but in which even our most basic morals and beliefs are often viewed with disdain and even condemnation. It can be extraordinarily difficult to avoid adopting many of the basic attitudes of the surrounding culture. It is all too common to find that even Jews who are fully observant have nevertheless internalized many of these basic attitudes, and often feel subtly embarrassed or ashamed of the teachings of the Torah. It is precisely for this reason that, in our generation, it is particularly important for us to stress and support Torah study.

UPDATE: I address some of these topics further in a follow-up post: The Sexual Prohibitions: Chukim or Mishpatim?

Friday, April 12, 2013

Tazria-Metzora - The Message of Tzaraas

The main subject in the parshios of Tazria-Metzora is tzaraas, in its various forms. (Tzaraas is often mistranslated as leprosy, however, in reality, it bears no resemblance to any known skin disease, and was a purely supernatural affliction.) The Sages (Talmud, Arachin 15b) teach us that the most common reason for tzaraas is the sin of lashon hara - harmful speech. (There are several different prohibitions that fall under the general category of lashon hara.)

The basic message of the affliction of tzaraas is to teach us the severity of the sin of lashon hara, for, as Maimonides writes in his conclusion to the laws of tzaraas (Hil. Tumas Tzaraas 16:10), the sin of lashon hara will eventually lead to mocking the sages, the prophets, the Torah, and ultimately even to denying the existence of God. God therefore provided us with this unique physical manifestation of punishment for this sin to emphasize the great importance of this matter.

The Zohar (Vayikra 46b) tells us that the ultimate cause of tzaraas is that, through sin, man causes himself to be separated from his spiritual Source. In kabbalistic terminology, his neshama - Divine "breath" or "soul" - leaves him. When the Jewish people are on a sufficiently high level (Ramban, Leviticus 13:47), this departure can manifest itself physically in the form of tzaraas. (This may explain why tzaraas manifests as white spots, indicating the departure of the soul, which is symbolically associated with blood (Leviticus 17:11).) This is especially true for sins involving speech, for, as the Zohar and many other sources teach us, the power of speech is deeply connected to the neshama - "soul" - and, thus, all else being equal, sins involving speech are particularly harmful.

The Chofetz Chaim
Based on this, tzaraas is an indication that one has lost his connection with God, that his sin has caused him to lose a basic aspect of his status as a human being. The Talmud (Pesachim 118) states that anyone who speaks lashon hara "it is fitting to cast him to the dogs." The Chofetz Chaim (R' Yisrael Meir Kagan, d.1933) explains ('ספר שמירת הלשון, שער הזכירה, פרק ח) that this teaches us that the sin of lashon hara causes a person to lose his status as a proper human being, making him even lower than a dog. For, as the Maharal explains, at the time of the exodus from Egypt, the dogs held their tongues from barking at the Jewish people (Exodus 11:7), but this person, whom God has graced with intelligence and understanding, cannot control his tongue.

In his discussion of tzaraas (Mitzva 169), the Sefer HaChinuch (14th century) writes that the basic message of tzaraas was to convey the message that God watches over all of man's deeds and that nothing happens without His will. Thus, even though tzaraas appeared to be a physical ailment, the afflicted person was to recognize that it was not a natural occurrence, but a punishment for his sins. Tzaraas was therefore to be "treated" exclusively by the kohanim; the same priests who are responsible for bringing atonement to the Jewish people through their performance of the Temple service. This was to reinforce in the sinner's mind the reality that God is fully aware of our actions and that nothing happens without His will.

While this is certainly an important lesson for us to learn, one might ask why this lesson would be of particular significance with regard to the sin of lashon hara, which, as we said earlier, is the most common reason why a person was afflicted with tzaraas. Perhaps the answer is that, like many sins between man and his fellow, the sin of lashon hara is actually rooted in a dysfunctional relationship with God. As the Chofetz Chaim writes ('ספר שמירת הלשון, שער התבונה, פרק ט), one of the main reasons we are tempted to speak lashon hara is because we feel that someone has harmed us, and we are tempted to strike back at him through lashon hara. However, the Chofetz Chaim continues, when we have proper bitachon (trust in God) we recognize that no other person can truly harm us. (This is also the explanation provided by the Sefer HaChinuch for the prohibition against revenge (Mitzva 241).)

In addition, it is common for baalei lashon hara (those who regularly engage in speaking lashon hara) to imagine that they are actually serving an important social function, for, by publicizing the misdeeds of others, they believe they are actually helping the community and fighting evil and injustice. In fact, within limitations, this argument is correct! The laws of lashon hara do provide for a number of exceptions when there is a beneficial purpose in conveying the information. However, while such exceptions certainly exist (and they should certainly be utilized when appropriate), they do not provide a blanket heter (dispensation) to publicize every misdeed, and certainly not every accusation or rumor of a misdeed, just so that people should be aware of the "issue" or "problem". The Chofetz Chaim (םפר חפץ חיים, הל' לשון הרע, י:יד) very emphatically stresses that it is all too easy to fall into the sin of lashon hara if one relies on these exceptions without careful attention to all the rules that apply. (This topic is briefly summarized here.)

It is certainly possible that diligent attention to the laws of lashon hara may occasionally result in someone "getting away" with doing bad things, and even harming others. The same could be said of many legal principles, such as evidentiary requirements, or concepts such as the obligation to judge others favorably. Every ethical or legal system has to find a balance between respecting the rights and dignity of those who are accused of misdeeds, and the rights and dignity of possible victims or of the community as a whole. The Torah provides us with such a balance, given to us by God, and we are obligated to respect those boundaries even when we imagine that it would be better, in a given case, to go beyond them.

It is here that bitachon plays a role. If we believe that, ultimately, God runs the world, then we recognize that, in the final analysis, it is God who punishes the wicked, and protects the innocent. While we certainly have an obligation to do whatever we can to fight against evil and injustice, our ability to do so is restricted by the ethical principles taught in the Torah. To go beyond those ethical principles is a basic violation of the principle of bitachon.

Thus, we can see how the lesson of bitachon - trust in God - which is rooted in our recognition that God runs the world and is aware of everything that takes place in the world - is particularly important for one who speaks lashon hara. Indeed, this brings us back to our earlier point, that the sin of lashon hara causes a separation between the sinner and God. As we have discussed previously, an important concept in Jewish  thought is that our thoughts create our spiritual reality. Thus, the sinner's failure to recognize God's presence in this world and His involvement in our lives, which lead him to the sin of lashon hara, is itself the root cause of his separation from God.

Thursday, February 7, 2013

Mishpatim - Our Spiritual Struggles are the Purpose of Our Existence

At the end of Parshas Mishpatim, the Torah returns to the narrative of the Sinai Revelation. (The commentaries debate whether the events described in Exodus 24 took place before or after the revelation of the Aseres Hadibros (Ten Commandments) described in Parshas Yisro.) It is here we find the famous declaration of the Jewish people (Exodus 24:7), "All that God has spoke, we shall do and we shall hear."

Maimonides
Two verses previously, the Torah states, "And he (Moses) sent the youths of the children of Israel and they brought up elevation-offerings and they slaughtered oxen as peace-offerings to God." This was the final step in sealing the covenant of kabalas haTorah - the receiving of the Torah - in which the Jewish people converted to Judaism. As Maimonides writes (Hil. Issurei Biah 13):
Israel entered the covenant through three things: Circumcision, immersion [in a mikva], and korban (a sacrifice). The circumcision took place in Egypt, as it states (Exodus 12:48), "And no uncircumcised man eat of it (the Paschal lamb)." ... Immersion was performed in the wilderness before the Giving of the Torah, as it says (19:10), "Sanctify them today and tomorrow  and they shall wash their clothing." And the korban, as it says, ""And he sent the youths of the children of Israel and they brought up elevation-offerings." They made these sacrifices on behalf of all Israel.
The Giving of the Torah at Mt. Sinai was what made the Jewish people Jewish; it was their conversion to Judaism, and it serves as the model for all later conversion. As Maimonides continues:
And so it is for [future] generations, when a non-Jew wishes to enter the covenant and shelter beneath the wings of the Shechina and he accepts upon himself the yoke of the Torah, he requires circumcision, immersion, and offering a korban. If she is a woman, she requires [only] immersion and a korban. For the Torah says (Numbers 15:15), "As for you, so for the convert," [meaning] just as you required circumcision, immersion, and the offering of a korban, a convert in [future] generations will also require circumcision, immersion, and the offering of a korban. ... And in our time, when we cannot bring korbanos, a convert requires circumcision and immersion, and when the Temple is built he will bring his korban
This event was the highest pinnacle of spiritual achievement in the history of the Jewish people. The Talmud (Shabbos 88a) tell us that when the Jewish people declared, "We shall do and we shall hear", six hundred thousand  angels came and set two crowns upon each Jewish man. Yet, just forty days later, the Jewish people sinned with the golden calf, and, the Talmud continues, they lost those crowns that they had earned only a short time before. Ultimately, despite the powerful and transformative experience of their conversion, the Jewish people were still subject to the same challenges and temptations that they had been subject to before they underwent their conversion.

If this was true even for the Jewish nation at Sinai, it is certainly true for converts of later generations. Despite the fact that conversion definitely effects a fundamental spiritual change in the spiritual makeup of the convert, the convert nevertheless retains the same basic personality, with the same spiritual challenges and difficulties that he had before his conversion. Indeed, earlier in this parsha (23:9), we are commanded, "Do not oppress a stranger (i.e. a convert); you know the nature of a stranger, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt." Rashi comments (based on Bava Metzia 59b):
בהרבה מקומות הזהירה תורה על הגר, מפני שסורו רע
The Torah admonishes in many places regarding [afflicting] the convert, because his original nature is bad (and he is therefore more likely to abandon the Torah - Gur Aryeh).
As should be self-evident, this does not mean that converts are inherently "bad" people. There are innumerable sources that speak of the great virtues of converts (including the medrash upon which I based the name of this blog). The point is that, just as that first generation of Jews faced exceptional challenges because of their background in Egypt, a convert also faces spiritual challenges that are far more difficult that those faced by someone who was born a Jew, and we are required to bear this in mind when we interact with a convert. It is also of vital importance for those who mentor converts to be sure to make this clear to a potential convert. It is all too easy for a potential convert to imagine that his conversion will transform him into a new reborn being, without the challenges and difficulties that he had before conversion. This is simply a falsehood, and only sets the convert up for a sense of failure and rejection when it inevitably fails to come true.

The truth is that this principle is relevant not just for converts, but for every Jew. We all face spiritual challenges with which we struggle and we are taught that God helps us in our struggles with the yetzer hara (evil inclination), as in the famous Talmudic passage (Yoma 38b), "בא לטהר מסייעין אותו" - "one who comes to be purified, they (i.e. Heavenly forces) help him." We are even supposed to pray to God for such help, and we find such prayers in the traditional prayer services. People sometimes misunderstand these teachings to mean that if they just try hard enough, at some point God will simply take their yetzer hara away from them. The reality, however, is that God does not - ever - directly change us for the better. As Maimonides states in Moreh Nevuchim (III:32): 
The nature of man is never changed by God by way of miracle.... it has never never been His will to do it and it never will be. If it were part of His will to change the nature of any person, the mission of the prophets and the giving of the Law would have been altogether superfluous.
The sources that describe God's help in our struggles with temptation are telling us only that if a person has truly reached the limits of his ability - so that he literally no longer has the ability to resist succumbing to sin - then God will give him the strength to continue the struggle. God helps us with our struggle, by giving us the strength to keep fighting, but the struggle itself is ultimately entirely our responsibility  and it will end only when we pass on to the next world. (See my previous discussion of this concept: Va'eira - The Hardening of Pharaoh's Heart.)

The Baal Shem Tov ('ספר הבעש"ט לך לך ג) is quoted as saying in the name R' Saadia Gaon, כי עיקר בריאת האדם בעוה"ז הוא לשבר מדות רעות שלו הטבעיות - "The primary purpose for the creation of man in this world is for him to break his natural bad characteristics." The struggle to overcome our natural, inborn urges is the primary purpose of our existence. It is the reason why we are here in this world.

Friday, January 25, 2013

Beshalach - The Beautification of Mitzvos

In the Song of the Sea, Moses and the Jewish people sang (Exodus 15:2), "זה א-לי ואנוהו" - "This is my God and I shall glorify Him!" Based on this verse, the Talmud (Shabbos 133b) teaches that we have an obligation to perform mitzvos in a beautiful manner:
זה אלי, ואנוהו - התנאה לפניו במצותֹ עשה לפניו סוכה נאה, ולולב נאה, ושופר נאה, ציצית נאה, ספר תורה נאה וכתוב בו לשמו בדיו נאה, בקולמוס נאה, בלבלר אומן וכורכו בשיראין נאין.
"This is my God, and I will glorify Him." - Be beautiful before Him with the mitzvos. Make before Him a beautiful sukkah, [use] a beautiful lulav, a beautiful shofar, beautiful tzitzis, and a beautiful Torah scroll, and write it for His sake with beautiful ink, with a beautiful reed, and with a skilled scribe, and wrap it with beautiful silks.
This is the concept of hiddur mitzva - the beautification of a mitzva. The Ramchal discusses this concept at some length in Mesillas Yesharim, citing this Talmudic passage (and other relevant passages) and expanding on this idea:
הרי דעת שפתותיהם ז"ל ברור מללו, שאין די בעשות המצוה לבד, אלא שצריך לכבדה ולהדרה. ולהוציא ממי שלהקל על עצמו יאמר אין הכבוד אלא לבני האדם המתפתים בהבלים אלה, אך הקב"ה אינו חושש לזה, כי הוא מרומם מדברים האלה ונשגב מהם, וכיון שהמצוה נעשית לאמתה די בזה, אמנם האמת הוא שהאדון ברוך הוא נקרא אל הכבוד, ואנו חייבים לכבדו, אע"פ שאינו צריך לכבודנו ולא כבודנו חשוב וספון לפניו, ומי שממעט בזה במקום שהיה יכול להרבות, אינו אלא חוטא.
Thus, the opinion of the Sages is very clear, that is not sufficient to simply do the mitzva alone, but it is necessary to honor and glorify it. This is a rejection of the opinion of one who, wishing to be lenient for himself, says that honor is only for human beings, who are seduced by such vanities, but God has no interest in this, for He is exalted far above such matters. Therefore, [he argues,] it is sufficient that the mitzva is simply fulfilled correctly. However, the truth is that God is called (Psalms 29:3) the "God of glory", and we are obligated to honor Him, even though He has no need for our glorification, and our glorification is of no real significance before Him.One who minimizes [his beautification of the mitzvos] when he has the ability to do more is simply a sinner.
The Ramchal then goes on to quote many additional sources that demonstrate the importance of this concept. But, while all of these sources clearly demonstrate that the sinner's argument is indeed false, they never really address the question of why his argument is incorrect. Why isn't it sufficient to simply fulfill the mitzvos precisely as they are commanded? Why is there an obligation to beautify the mitzvos?

Perhaps a hint to the answer can be found in a passage from Maimonides, when he concludes his discussion of the laws of acceptable oils for the meal offerings in the Holy Temple (Hil. Issurei HaMizbei'ach 7:11):
ומאחר שכולן כשרין למנחות למה נמנו, כדי לידע יפה שאין למעלה ממנו והשוה והפחות שהרוצה לזכות עצמו יכוף יצרו הרע וירחיב ידו ויביא קרבנו מן היפה המשובח ביותר שבאותו המין שיביא ממנו, הרי נאמר בתורה והבל הביא גם הוא מבכורות צאנו ומחלביהן וישע י"י אל הבל ואל מנחתו, והוא הדין בכל דבר שהוא לשם האל הטוב שיהיה מן הנאה והטוב, אם בנה בית תפלה יהיה נאה מבית ישיבתו, האכיל רעב יאכיל מן הטוב והמתוק שבשולחנו, כסה ערום יכסה מן היפה שבכסותו, הקדיש דבר יקדיש מן היפה שבנכסיו וכן הוא אומר כל חלב ליי' וגו'.
If they (i.e. kinds of oil) are all valid for the menachos (meal offerings), then why did [the Sages] rank them? So that one can know which is the very best, which are of equal status, and which are inferior. For one who wishes to earn merit should subdue his evil inclination and open his hands wide and bring an offering from the very finest and best of the species that he is bringing. For, behold, it says in the Torah (Genesis 4:4), "And Abel also brought from the from the firstborns of his sheep and from their fats, and God turned to Abel and his offering."
This concept applies to everything that is done for the sake of God, Who is good, that it should be from the finest and the best. When one builds a house of prayer, it should be more beautiful than his house of dwelling. When one feeds the hungry, he should feed them from the best and the tastiest food on his table. When one clothes the naked, cover him with the most beautiful of his garments. When one consecrates an item,he should consecrate the most beautiful of his possessions. And so it says (Leviticus 3:16), "All the fat is God's...."
Maimonides introduces this idea by saying that "one who wishes to earn merit should subdue his evil inclination and open his hands wide." In other words, doing the mitzvos in the most beautiful manner is, fundamentally, about subduing our own nature and changing ourselves for the better. Of course God Himself has no need for glory and honor. In truth, He, in of Himself, has no need for our mitzvos either! The mitzvos were given to us for our benefit. They are what enable us to connect to God.

The same is true for the concept of hiddur mitzva. When we beautify a mitzva, in the same way that we would beautify a gift that we give to someone that we love and respect, we reinforce in our own the minds the reality of God and of our relationship with Him. It is this recognition that is at the core of all Jewish spirituality.

Perhaps this explains why the Talmud finds this concept alluded to in this particular verse, which describes the amazing spiritual revelation that the Jewish people experienced at the splitting of the Red Sea. How can we, today, in any way grasp what it means to declare, "This is my God!" - when "this" refers to a direct spiritual experience? Perhaps the answer is that when we sincerely perform the mitzvos, not as formal legal obligations, but as expressions of a genuine loving relationship, with all the love and honor that we put into our most valued human relationships, then we too can eventually come to experience the personal relationship with God expressed in the statement, "This is my God!"

Thursday, January 10, 2013

Va'eira - The Hardening of Pharaoh's Heart

In Parshas Va'eira we read of the first seven of the ten plagues that God inflicted upon the Egyptians. Before the plagues, God instructed Moses to go and speak to Pharaoh, demanding that he allow the Jewish people to go free. In the course of these instructions, God tells Moses (Exodus 7:3), "ואני אקשה את לב פרעה" - "And I shall harden Pharaoh's heart" - and that Pharaoh would not listen to his pleas and God would perform many "signs and wonders" and would take the Jewish people out of Egypt "with an outstretched hand". And indeed, we find that after the sixth, eighth, ninth, and tenth plagues that "God strengthened the heart of Pharaoh", ultimately culminating in the destruction of the Egyptian army in the Red Sea.

Many commentators discuss how we are to understand the concept of God "hardening" Pharaoh's heart. if God hardened Pharaoh's heart, then how could he be held responsible for his actions? Moreover, one of the most basic principles of Judaism is the concept of free-will. Yet these passages imply that free-will is not guaranteed, and that it is possible that a person could lose his free-will.

Maimonides
Traditional Depiction
Indeed, Maimonides explains that it is possible for a truly wicked person to be punished with the loss of his free will, making it impossible for him to repent for his evil deeds. He writes (Hil. Teshuva 6:3):
It is possible that a person would commit so great a sin, or so many sins, to the point that justice demands from the True Judge that the punishment appropriate for the willful sins of this sinner is that teshuva (repentance) should be withheld from him and he should lose the ability to turn from his evil, so that he will die and be lost in the sins he has committed. ...
Therefore it says in the Torah (Exodus 14:4), "I shall strengthen the heart of Pharaoh," for Pharaoh had sinned on his own volition and was wicked towards the people of Israel that dwelt in his land.... Justice required that teshuva be withheld from him until he had been punished. God therefore hardened his heart. 
In his commentary on this verse, the Ramban also addresses this issue and provides two answers. The first answer is identical with the approach of Maimonides. In his second answer, however, the Ramban argues that the "hardening" of Pharaoh's heart does not refer to a loss of free-will, but the opposite, that God gave Pharaoh the strength of will to be able to defy God despite the incredible pressure brought about by the plagues. At no point did Pharaoh actually desire to let the Jewish people go. It was only that, after all of these plagues, he simply did not have to strength to continue fighting. Thus God strengthened the will of Pharaoh, leaving him free to make the choice that he wished to make.

This approach is also taken by the Seforno (commentary on Torah by R' Ovadia Seforno, d.1550) and the Sefer HaIkkarim (philosophical work by R' Joseph Albo, d.1444) and appears to be the dominant approach taken by most later commentators as well. Among these later commentators is the famous Dubno Maggid, R' Yakov Kranz (d.1804), in his commentary (Kochav L'Yakov on the haftara of Lech Lecha) on the verse (Isaiah 40:29), "He gives strength to the weary, and for the powerless He gives abundant might." The Dubno Maggid cites the famous medrash about Joseph in the house of Potiphar, that states that Joseph was on the verge of succumbing to the seductive ploys of his master's wife, when God sent him a vision of his father, Jacob. This vision inspired Joseph to absolutely reject the sinful advances of Potiphar's wife. The Dubno Maggid asks why the Sages revealed this fact, which would appear to reflect so poorly on Joseph, as he was on the verge of committing such a severe sin and was only prevented from doing so by a Divine vision? Moreover, doesn't this diminish the free-will of Joseph? (Indeed, the Sages view Joseph's resistance to Potiphar's wife as one his greatest acts of righteousness - "for he sanctified the Name of God in secret" (Sotah 10b). Yet how many people would commit a sin immediately after receiving a prophetic vision?)

The Dubno Maggid therefore explains that the reality was that Joseph had absolutely no desire to sin and had resisted Potiphar's wife with all his strength. But ultimately, the pressure of her campaign had simply become too much for him. He simply did not have the strength to fight any longer (which, if we imagine his circumstances, as a young slave in a foreign land with no moral support of any kind, is not surprising). He was on the verge of succumbing to sin, not because of desire, but because he had reached the limits of his strength to fight. At this point, God gave him renewed strength by sending him a vision. This is the idea expressed in the verse that God "gives strength to the weary," which, the Dubno Maggid explains, is fundamentally the same thing that happened with Pharaoh. In both cases, God gave them the renewed strength of will to resist what would otherwise have been overwhelming pressure. The difference between the two is only that in the case of Joseph his true desire was to do what was right, and in the case of Pharaoh his true desire was to do evil.

These two approaches may be reflected in the debate between the Sages, R' Yochanan and R' Shimon Lakish, in the medrash (Shemos Raba 13:3, cited in the Ramban):
"For I have hardened his heart." (Exodus 10:1) - R' Yochanan said, "This gives an opening for heretics to claim that he had no opportunity to repent!" R' Shimon ben Lakish said to him, "May the mouths of the heretics be sealed! Rather, [the true understanding is] "He mocks the mockers" (Proverbs 3:34) - He warns him once, twice, and a third time, and he [still] does not repent, and He closes his heart to repentance in order to punish him for his sin. So it was with the wicked Pharaoh. Once God had communicated with him five times (i.e. the first five plagues) and he paid no heed, God said to him, 'You have stiffened your neck and hardened your heart, behold, I shall add impurity upon your impurity!"
The Yefeh To'ar (commentary on Midrash Raba by R' Shmuel Yafa Ashkenazi, 16th century) argues that R' Yochanan follows the second approach that we have described, that Pharaoh did not lose his free will. Thus he says that a simple reading of the verse would seem to support to the claims of the heretics that Pharaoh had no free-will and therefore did not deserve to be punished. R' Shimon ben Lakish, however, following the approach of Maimonides, says that Pharaoh did indeed lose his free will, but that the arguments of the heretics are nevertheless baseless, for this was his punishment for his extreme wickedness.

R' Elya Lopian
Whether we follow the interpretation of the Yefeh To'ar or not, it would seem clear that R' Shimon ben Lakish is the following the approach of Maimonides, that Pharaoh did indeed lose his ability to repent for his sins. However, in Lev Eliyahu (vol.2, p.49), R' Elya Lopian (d.1970) argues - emphatically - that teshuva is always possible, stating:
Know and remember this: That one who says, "I am unable to break my desire and stand up against my nature," this is heresy. As we see in the debate between R' Yochanan and R'Shimon ben Lakish... that both agree that this is what is said by heretics.
(Thus, in a lengthy note on the Lev Eliyahu (p.49-51), R' Sholom Schwadron (d.1997) argues (based upon a later passage in Hil. Teshuva) that even according to Maimonides, it is possible for a person to regain his ability to repent through prayer.)

Instead, R' Elya Lopian (p.44) understands the opinion of R' Shimon ben Lakish to mean not that God takes away the sinner's ability to repent, but rather that God ceases to reach out to the sinner to motivate him to repent.

This idea is also found in the Kedushas Levi (R' Levi Yitzchak of Berdichev, d.1809). The Kedushas Levi (Deuteronomy 28:1) states that the Sages tell us that there is a Heavenly voice that calls out every day, "Return, O wayward sons!" (Jeremiah 3:22). This Heavenly voice is heard, on a spiritual level, by every Jew, and it serves to arouse his soul to repentance. However, the Sages tell us of certain Sage, R' Elisha ben Avuya, who became a heretic and became known as Acher. On a few instances, when asked why he did not repent from his sins, he responded that he had heard a Heavenly voice call out, "Return, O wayward sons! - Except for Acher!" (Chagiga 15a)

The Kedushas Levi explains that Acher did not lose the ability to repent, and if he had repented, his repentance would have been accepted. What Acher had lost was the daily Divine inspiration towards repentance that is the normal state for every Jew. Acher's sins were so great that the Heavenly voice no longer functioned to arouse his soul to repentance. For Acher, without that Divine inspiration, repentance would be far more difficult than for an ordinary Jew, but it remained within his power to do.

Tuesday, November 13, 2012

The Greeks and Greek Philosophy in Traditional Jewish Thought

The Greeks first entered Jewish history via the conquest of the Persian Empire by Alexander the Great, towards the end of their “Classical Period”. Historians refer to the period beginning with the death of Alexander the Great as the “Hellenistic Period”.

Origins of the Greeks

In Genesis 5:32 we are told that Noah had three sons, Shem, Ham, and Japheth. In Genesis 10 we read how these three men were the ancestors of all the “seventy nations” of humanity. Japheth had seven sons, one of whom was named Javan (יון – pronounced “Yavan”). According to Jewish tradition, Javan was the ancestor of the Greeks. Traditionally, the Jews have always referred to the Greeks as Yavanim rather than Hellenes, the name that the Greeks used for themselves.[1]

Although the Greeks viewed themselves as one group, bound together by bonds of blood, culture, and religion, they were far from being a unified people. On the contrary, all of Greek history is made up of constant wars between the different Greek states. It was only when confronted by the clear threat of the Persian Empire that the Greek nations were able to unite in mutual defense. Even this was only achieved with great difficulty and lasted for a very short time. Not long after the Persian conquest was defeated, the Peloponnesian war broke out between Athens and Sparta and their respective allies.

Eventually, the Greek states were united through the conquest of Philip of Macedonia. Macedonia was a semi-Greek state to the north of Greece. When Philip was assassinated, his son Alexander, whom we know as Alexander the Great, succeeded him. Alexander’s rise to power marks the beginning of a new era in world history.

Greek Wisdom

The Greeks were unique among the nations in their pursuit of wisdom and knowledge. The Maharal (R’ Yehuda Loew, d.1609) writes (ספר נר מצוה):
... מלכות זה [יון] כנגד ... השכל, שהמלכות הזה היה בו החכמה והתבונה ... כי כל ענין המלכות זה שהיו מבקשים החכמה...
This kingdom [Greece] represents the… intellect, for this kingdom had wisdom and understanding… for the entire theme of this kingdom was that they sought wisdom.
The Sages recognized Greek culture as being uniquely superior to other non-Jewish cultures. Thus, for example, the one language in which it was permitted to write a Torah scroll, other than Hebrew, was ancient Greek. The Mishna (Megilla 1:8) states:
...בספרים לא התירו שיכתבו אלא יונית
For [Torah] scrolls they only permitted Greek.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Megilla 1:9) explains:
בדקו ומצאו שאין התורה יכולה להיתרגם כל צורכה אלא יוונית
The [Sages] searched and found that the Torah cannot be properly translated in any language except Greek.[2]
The Talmud explains that this was a fulfillment of the blessing given to Japheth, the ancestor of the Greeks, by Noah (Genesis 9:27):
יפת אלקים ליפת וישכון באהלי שם...
May God expand Japheth, and he will dwell in the tents of Shem…
The Greeks were the creators of philosophy. Indeed, the term “philosophy” is a Greek word that means, “love of knowledge”. In ancient times, the term “philosophy” was applied to all forms of wisdom, including the sciences. However, and perhaps more importantly, Greek philosophy emphasized the study of the nature of the world, the definition of good and evil, and other basic questions about existence and humanity. It is in this regard that we use the term “philosophy” today.

Although the Jewish people did not engage in formal philosophical study in ancient times, the Greeks still recognized the Jews as being uniquely knowledgeable in these fields. As historian John G. Gager has written, "In the Greco-Roman world, the earliest and most abiding view of the Jews was as a nation of philosophers."[3]


The influence of Greek philosophy – especially the works of the greatest of the Greek philosophers, such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle – on human thought has been absolutely immense, extending even into modern times. Thus, it is not surprising that many later Jewish sources discuss the teachings of these philosophers at great length. While the Jewish perspective on Greek thought is often highly critical, even the most critical sources will generally acknowledge the intellectual achievements of these men. For example, Rabbi Yehuda HaLevi, a strong critic of both the philosophers and of philosophy in general, makes the following statement defending them in his Kuzari:[4]
הפילוסופים אין להאשים אותם, מפני שהם עם שלא נחלו חכמה ולא תורה....
ולפיכך, בדין הוא שלא נאמין לאריסטו בחכמתו, מפני שהטריח את שכלו ומחשבתו בעבור שלא היתה בידו קבלה ממי שיאמין בהגדתו... ואלו היה הפילוסוף באמה שינחל בה מקבלות ומפרסמות שאינו יכול לדחות אותם היה מתעסק בהקשותיו ומופתיו להחזיק החידוש – עם קשיו – כאשר החזיק הקדמות, אשר היא יותר קשה לקבל.
The philosophers should not be blamed [for their errors], for they are a nation that did not inherit wisdom and Torah…[5]
Therefore, we cannot have confidence in the philosophy of Aristotle. For he labored with his intellect and thought because he did not have a reliable tradition …. If the philosopher had lived in a nation [like the Jews] with reliable and well-known traditions that could not be falsified, he would have labored with his logical arguments and proofs to strengthen the concept of creation – with its difficulties – as he [instead] did with the concept of eternity, which is even more difficult to accept.[6]
Thus, R’ Yehuda HaLevi argues that the failure of the Greek philosophers to recognize the truth of creation and of God’s relationship with this world stemmed primarily from their exclusive reliance on their own intellect because they came from a nation with no reliable tradition of revelation. Indeed, the Kuzari (4:13, 5:14) later quotes Socrates making this very point:[7]
אמר סקראט אל העם, חכמתכם זאת האלקית אינני מכחישה, אך אני אומר שאינני יודעה, אמנם אני חכם בחכמה אנושית.
(ר"ל, מאחר שאין לי דת מקובלת, בדין הוא שאהיה נוטה אחר העיון האנושי – פי' אוצר נחמד.)
Socrates said to the nation [i.e. the leaders of Athens], “I do not deny your wisdom of god, but I simply do not know it, however, I am knowledgeable in human wisdom.”
(Meaning, “As I do not have a received religion [i.e. a religion based on a revelation and reliable tradition], it is only logical that I should turn towards human understanding.” – Otzar Nechmad)
Many traditional sources argue that the immense intellectual achievements of these Greek philosophers had to result from Jewish influence. Thus, for example, there are legends that Socrates received his wisdom from Ahitophel and Asaph haKarchi[8], and that Plato[9] received wisdom from the prophets, particularly Jeremiah.[10]

Aristotle

Aristotle
The philosopher Aristotle was one of the greatest intellects of all time. His numerous works were all recognized as the authoritative works in their fields, and they covered every single area of human knowledge of that time. He wrote on the physical and biological sciences, on logic and mathematics, political science and psychology, art and poetry, and many other fields. His work was so influential that later generations treated his writings almost like holy script.

Aristotle was hired by Philip of Macedonia to tutor his son Alexander. Later, when Alexander became the king of Greece, and eventually most of the civilized world, he supported his former tutor, enabling him to found his own philosophical school in Athens and to engage in extensive research.

Jewish tradition has very mixed feelings about Aristotle. On one hand, Maimonides clearly had a very high opinion of Aristotle, writing:[11]

דעת ארסטו היא תכלית דעת האדם מלבד מי שנשפע עליהם השפע האלקי עד שישיגו אל מעלת הנבואה אשר אין למעלה ממנה.
The intellect of Aristotle was the ultimate intellect possible for a human being except for someone upon whom flows the Divine “flow” to the point that he achieves prophecy, above which there is no higher level.
Nevertheless, Maimonides was far from a slavish follower of Aristotle, especially when Aristotle’s conclusions differed from the Torah. Similarly, the Kuzari quoted above, and other sources, appear to see him as a basically honest and brilliant man who struggled to find the truth but failed due to his background. There is even a legend (almost certainly apocryphal) that, towards the end of his life, he became acquainted with the teachings of the Torah and recognized its truth.[12]

On the other hand, other traditional sources speak very negatively of Aristotle. For example, the Vilna Gaon (R’ Elijah of Vilna, d.1797) is quoted as saying "שודאי הוא שהיה אריסטו כופר מתחילה ועד סוף" – “It is certain that Aristotle was a denier from beginning to end.”[13]

The Rema (R’ Moshe Isserles, d.1572), in his work, Toras HaOlah (1:11), recounts a story of Aristotle which reflects the belief, mentioned previously, that Greek wisdom originally came from contact with the Jews, and which also puts Aristotle in a very negative light:
כתב בשבילי אמונה כי כל עיקר חכמת ארסטוטליס גנובה מחכמת שלמה ע"ה, כי כאשר כבש אלכסנדרוס מוקדן ירושלים, השליט לאריסטוטלס רבו על אוצר ספרי שלמה, וכל דבר טוב שמצא בהן כתב שמו עליו, ועירב בהן מקצת דעות רעות כמו קדמות העולם וכפירת השגחה לחפות עליו שלא ידעו הבריות שבאו אחריו שגנב החכמה מיהודי, ואפשר שכל דבר שלא מצא עליו מופת חותך בדברי שלמה לא האמינו
It is written in Shvilei Emunah[14] that the entire essence of the wisdom of Aristotle was stolen from the wisdom of [King] Solomon. For when Alexander the Macedonian conquered Jerusalem, he appointed his teacher, Aristotle, over the library of the books of Solomon, and every good thing that [Aristotle] found there, he wrote his name on, and he blended in some bad opinions, such as the [belief in] the pre-existence of the world and the denial of [Divine] providence, to cover himself so that the people who came after him would not know that he stole the wisdom from a Jew. And, possibly, anything in the words of Solomon which he did not find a clear proof for he did not believe.[15]
Interestingly, a number of works attributed to Aristotle were translated into Hebrew and were treated as valid sources of wisdom. In particular, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics – known in Hebrew as Sefer HaMiddos – is particularly significant and widely cited.

Hellenism and Judaism

R' Samson Raphael Hirsch
Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch (d.1888) writes[16] that Hellenism serves a vital spiritual function in lifting man out of the pit of savage vulgarity and licentiousness that is symbolized by Ham, the raw, uncultured man. Only after man has developed the higher and nobler sensibility symbolized by Japheth is it then possible for him to turn to the even higher spiritual aspirations of Shem:
[T]he education of raw unrefined humanity ton the sense of beauty is not the highest. Wavering, unsettled is the culture which only gives Man the satisfying of his own higher standards as the criterion of the activities of his life, but gives him no ideal external to himself, glowing in its own lights, as a beacon, a goal and a criterion. Only that which can elevate the mind to a knowledge of, and the feelings to a recognition of what is good and true in itself, leads a man to the height of what he is meant to be. …
But… this goal will not be achieved at once. … Out of the raw, uncultured man, a cultured man has first to be made. The demand which the God of Shem makes is no small one, it demands the complete devotion and and submission of the whole person to God. A person must first acquire “the taste” of something higher than he is in his raw nature, even if this something higher is at first also something that appeals to his senses. … This culture of beauty and grace… is a precursor of the semitic mission, a preparatory school for teaching people to reach the loftier concept of life, the still greater beauty which lies in a harmonious joining all the aspects of life under the single idea of devotion to God.

[1] The Greeks were divided into three tribes, the Ionians, the Dorians, and the Aeolians. Of these three groups, the Ionians appear to have been dominant. In particular, Athens – the center of Greek culture and, for much of Greek history, the most powerful Greek state – was Ionian. Ionia is also the name given to a region of Asia Minor on the eastern shore of Aegean Sea that was settled predominantly by Ionian Greeks. The dominance of Ionians in Asia Minor would have brought them into more direct contact with the Persian Empire and the other Eastern centers of civilization. The Ionians were also the dominant group responsible for Greek philosophy and science. All of these factors may explain why the Greeks as a whole were known, by the Jews and others, as Yavanim. Interestingly, the Ionians claimed to be descended from a man name Ion. This individual may well be identical with Javan the son of Japheth.

[2] However, Maimonides (Hil. Tefilin 1:19) writes that the Greek language was corrupted in later years and can no longer be used for Torah scrolls.

[4] Quoting from the arrangement of the Kuzari made by Rav Yechezkel Sarna, based on Kuzari 1:63-65.

[5] One of Rav Yehuda HaLevi’s basic teachings is the superiority of knowledge revealed by God (Torah) and passed down through a reliable tradition (mesorah) over knowledge found purely through human intellectual effort.

[6] In this paragraph, R’ Yehuda HaLevi focuses on what is possibly the most significant area of disagreement between the Torah and the philosophy of Aristotle. One of the most basic teachings of the Torah is chiddush ha’olam – that the world is created from nothing. Aristotle, however, taught kadmus ha’olam – that the world has always existed. It should perhaps be noted that the Abarbanel, in his Mifalos Elokim (5:3) argues that Aristotle, in making this argument, did not intend to argue against the Torah teaching that the world was created by supernatural means, but against other Greek schools of philosophy which believed that the world had come into existence by natural means.

[7] I do not know what R’ Yehuda Halevi’s source was for this quote, however, while not made explicitly, the sentiment is echoed in a few passages in Plato’s Apology, in which Socrates defends himself against accusations of heresy and atheism.

[8] Seder HaDoros (ג"א שפ"ה)

[9] Plato’s philosophical system, in particular, has a strong resemblance to concepts in Torah, particularly Kabala. A note printed in the beginning of the Tikkunei Zohar im Biur HaGra states:
חכמת הקבלה היא חכמת רוחניות התורה ושרשיה, כפי שבאה בקבלה לראשי האומה, והאור האלוקי הזה הופיע גם באהלי יפת, וגדולי חכמי יון נאותו לאור יקרות זה, והתקרבו במקצת דעותיהם לדעות חכמי הקבלה, וביחוד הפילוסוף אפלטון היוני...
The wisdom of kabala is the spiritual wisdom of the Torah and its roots, as it was received by the heads of the nation. This godly light also shown in the tents of Japheth, and the great sages of Greece enjoyed this precious light and came close, in part, to the opinions of the sages of kabala, especially the philosopher Plato the Greek.
[10] The Shalsheles HaKabala (R’ Gedaliah ibn Yachya, d.1588) makes the following statement:
קבלתי ממורי הגאון זקני זצ"ל כי הוא ראה בפי' הכוזר שעשה ר' נתנאל ן' כספי האומר אמר אפלטון אני הייתי עם ירמיהו במצרים ובתחלה הייתי לועג עליו ועל דבריו ולבסוף כאשר הרגלתי לדבר עמו ולדקדק במעשיו וראיתי כי דבריו דברי אלקים חיים אז אמרתי בלבי וקיימתי שהוא חכם ונביא
I received from my teacher, the gaon, my grandfather זצ"ל, that he saw in the commentary on the Kuzari written by Rav Nasanel ibn Kaspi (early 15th century) a statement quoting Plato saying, “I was with Jeremiah in Egypt, and in the beginning I mocked him and his words, but in the end, when I spoke to him regularly and carefully observed his deeds, I saw that his words were the words of the living God. Then I said in my heart and I determined that he was a sage and a prophet.”
(Page 137 in 1889 Warsaw edition.) Also see Seder HaDoros ג"א ש' and Midrash Talpiyos ענף ירמיה.

[11] Near the end of a letter he wrote to Rav Shmuel ibn Tibbon on the translation of Moreh Nevuchim.

[12] The Shalsheles HaKabala writes that a book was found, supposedly written by Aristotle, in which Aristotle recanted from all of his philosophical teachings and acknowledged the truth of the Torah. The Shalsheles HaKabala then goes on to quote at length from a letter, appended to this work, which Aristotle supposedly wrote to his disciple, Alexander the Great, in which he writes that he met a Jewish sage who proved to him the truth of the Torah and that he now wishes he could destroy all of his earlier works. Seder HaDoros even quotes a source that claims that Aristotle converted to Judaism!

[13] הקדמת ר' מנחם מענדל משקלאב לפי' הגר"א על מס' אבות – This statement may have been specifically intended to contradict the legends of Aristotle’s later change of heart.

[14] By Rav Meir ibn Aldabi (14th century).

[15] This last sentence is not from the Shvilei Emunah, but from the Rema. It appears to be an attempt to partially justify Aristotle’s mixture of false teachings into the wisdom of Solomon, similar to the argument of Socrates quoted from the Kuzari previously.

[16] In his commentary on Genesis 9:27 and in an essay titled, “Hellenism and Judaism” in Collected Writings of Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, vol.2.




Friday, November 2, 2012

The Ten Trials of Abraham

According to the Talmud (Avos 5:3), Abraham was tested ten times and he passed all of the tests. The purpose of these tests was to "to demonstrate how great was the love of Abraham our Father" for he never questioned God's judgment.

Maimonides
In his commentary on the Mishna, Maimonides lists the ten tests, all of which are clearly stated in the Torah:
  1. The command for Abraham to leave his home and live in a strange land. (12:1)
  2. The famine that occurred in the land of Canaan after God promised to make Abraham into a great nation in that land. (12:2-10)
  3. The violence of the Egyptians when they abducted Sarah. (12:14-20)
  4. The war with the four kings. (14)
  5. Marrying Hagar after giving up hope that Sarah would have children. (16:1-2)
  6. The commandment of circumcision in his old age. (17:1)
  7. The violence of the king of Gerar who also abducted Sarah. (20)
  8. Sending away Hagar after she had borne him a child. (21)
  9. The difficult commandment to send away his own son, Yishmael. (21)
  10. The binding of Isaac. (22)
There are several other opinions on the exact numeration of the ten tests. Many of these alternate lists include incidents that are not written explicitly in the Torah but are only known from midrashim (such as Abraham being thrown into the furnace in Ur Kasdim).

Vayeira - The Concept of Heavenly Trial ("Nisayon")

Parshas Vayeira ends with the story of the final trial of Abraham, the Akeidas Yitzchak - the Binding of Isaac. The Torah introduces this story with the explicit statement that this was a test: "והאלקים נסה את אברהם" - "and God tested Abraham."

What is the function of a נסיון – a “test” from God? Maimonides (Moreh Nevuchim 3:24) says that this topic is “מן הקשיים החמורים שבתורה” – “from the most difficult topics in the Torah.” The primary difficulty, of course, is that God already knows if the person will pass the test, which would seem to make the test unnecessary. Indeed, as the verse in Psalms 11:5 states, "ה' צדיק יבחן" - "God tests the righteous"; God only imposes tests upon those whom He already knows to be righteous.

Clearly, then, a Heavenly trial - a nisayon - is not a "test" in the conventional sense. Rather, it serves a positive function on the person being tested or the people around him.

The Midrash (ב"ר לב:ג and elsewhere) gives three analogies to help us understand the concept of Heavenly trials upon the righteous. As explained by the commentaries, these three analogies describe three different functions that can be found in Heavenly trials. In most cases, such as with the Akeidas Yitzchak, all three functions exist simultaneously.

The first analogy given by the midrash  is to a potter who bangs on his pots to demonstrate their durability in order that people should buy. Of course, the potter only bangs on his best pots for this purpose, banging on his worst pots would defeat his purpose. Similarly, God subjects righteous to trials in order to demonstrate their great virtues to the world so that others will emulate them. (This is the approach taken by Maimonides in Moreh Nevuchim.)

Beating flax in ancient Egypt.
The second analogy is to a flax worker who beats on flax to improve the quality of the linen made from it. When beating the flax, care must be taken not to break the actual fibers. The fibers in poor quality flax are more susceptible to breakage, and therefore can only be beaten minimally if at all, and are used to produce poorer quality products.  The better the quality of the flax, the more the workers beat it to create a finer quality linen. Similarly, God subjects the righteous to great challenges because through these challenges they can grow to higher and higher levels of righteousness.

The third analogy is to a farmer who owns two oxen, a weak ox and a strong ox. The farmer uses the strong ox to do the hardest and most important tasks, while the weaker ox is only used for easy tasks. Similarly, God subjects the righteous to great challenges so that their merit will benefit the entire world.

Thursday, September 20, 2012

Forgiveness for Inter-Personal Sins

Jewish law requires us to ask forgiveness from anyone whom we may have harmed, whether the harm was physical, financial, emotional, or social. We are also required to be gracious in granting forgiveness. The Talmud (Bava Kamma 8:7) states, "From where do we know that it is cruel to not forgive? For it says, "Abraham prayed to God and God healed Abimelech..." (Genesis 20:17).

Maimonides writes (Hil. Teshuvah 2:9-10):
Repentance and Yom Kippur only atone for sins between Man and God such as eating forbidden foods or engaging in forbidden sexual relations. Sins between one man and his fellow, such as striking, cursing, or stealing are never forgiven until one pays up his debt and appeases his fellow. Even if he returns the money he owes he must still ask for forgiveness. Even if he only spoke badly about him, he must appease and beseech until he is forgiven. If his fellow refuses to forgive him then he must bring a group of three of his fellows and go to him and ask him [for forgiveness]. If he still does not forgive him he must go to him a second and third time (with a different group of three people). If he still refuses to forgive him he may cease and the other is the sinner. If [however, the injured party] is his teacher (rebbe) he must go to him even a thousand times until he is forgiven.
It is forbidden to be cruel and difficult to appease, rather, a person must be quick to forgive and difficult to anger and when the sinner asks for forgiveness he should forgive him willingly and wholeheartedly....
In Shulchan Aruch (R' Yosef Karo, d.1575) in the laws of Yom Kippur (Orech Chaim 606:1) we find essentially the same thing. The Rema (R' Moshe Isserles, d.1572) adds that one may withhold forgiveness if it is for the benefit of the person asking. The Mishna Berurah (R' Yisrael Meir Kagan, d.1933) explains that it may be appropriate to withhold forgiveness to teach the supplicant not to take it lightly. The Rema also permits withholding forgiveness when someone spread false rumors about you, however the Mishna Berurah says that in such a case one should still forgive.

In the prayer titled Tefilah Zaka which many people recite before Kol Nidrei on the eve of Yom Kippur it says:
I extend complete forgiveness to everyone who has sinned against me, whether physically or monetarily, or spoke lashon hara (negative speech) about me or even false reports. And (I also forgive them) for any damages, whether on my body or my property, and for all sins between a man and his fellow except for money which I can claim in a court of law and except for someone who sins against me saying, "I will sin against him and he will forgive me". Except for these I grant complete forgiveness and no person should be punished on my account. And just as I forgive everyone so should You grant me favor in the eyes of all men that they should completely forgive me.
The complete prayer is printed in many machzorim (holiday prayer books).