Chukas - Chukim: The Importance of the Non-Rational Commandments

A famous passage in the Talmud (Yoma 67b), based on Leviticus 18:4, tells us that there are two basic categories of mitzvos - mishpatim and chukim:

ת"ר "את משפטי תעשו" - דברים שאלמלא לא נכתבו דין הוא שיכתבו. אלו הן: ע"ז, וגילוי עריות, ושפיכות דמים, וגזל, וברכת השם. "ואת חקותי תשמרו" - דברים שהשטן ועכומ"ז משיבים עליהם. ואלו הן: אכילת חזיר, ולבישת שעטנז, וחליצת יבמה, וטהרת מצורע, ושעיר המשתלח. ושמא תאמר מעשה תהו הן, ת"ל "אני ה'" - אני ה' חקקתים, אין לך רשות להרהר בהם.

Our Rabbis taught: [The Torah states,] "You shall do my judgements (mishpatim)" - These are matters that, if they had not been written [in the Torah], reason would require that they be written. These include [the prohibitions against] idolatry, sexual immorality, murder, robbery, and blasphemy. "And you shall guard my decrees (chukim)" - These are matters that the soton and the idolaters challenge [as being unreasonable]. These include [laws such as the prohibitions against] eating pig, wearing shaatnez (fabric made from wool and linen), [and the laws of] chalitza of a yevama (widowed sister-in-law who is subject to levirate mariage), the purification of a metzora ("leper"), and the goat that is sent away [as part of the Yom Kippur ritual in the Temple]. And lest you say that these are empty matters, the Torah teaches us, saying, "I am Hashem" - I, Hashem, have decreed these laws, and you do not have the right to doubt them.

The Talmud defines mishpatim as laws that "if they had not been written, reason would require that they be written." In other words, these mitzvos serve functions that are clearly comprehensible by human reason, to the degree that we would recognize the need for such laws even if God had not commanded them. Chukim, however, are simply decrees from on high. As Rashi puts it, "חק משמע דבר שאינו אלא גזירת מצות מלך" - "Chok implies something that is nothing but a decree by command of the king." From a human perspective, a chok appears to be arbitrary, even irrational. It is certainly not something that we would have come up with on our own.

As the Talmud points out, throughout history the chukim have been mocked, both internally, by Jews who have fallen prey to the doubts of their inner soton (the inner "opponent" that seduces man to sin and heresy) and, externally, by the nations of the world. However, as the people of God, who merited to hear God speak to us directly at Mt. Sinai, we have no right to doubt the authority of these laws simply because we do not understand their purpose.

The law of the para aduma - the "red heifer" - that we read of in this week's parsha is considered the quintessential chok, the perfect example of a mitzva that does not make sense rationally (mainly due to its paradoxical nature). Rashi, in his first comment on the parsha, writes:

זאת חקת התורה - לפי שהשטן ואומות העולם מונין את ישראל לומר, מה המצוה הזאת? ומה טעם יש בה? לפיכך כתב בה "חקה" - גזירה היא מלפני, אין לך רשות להרהר אחריה.

[The Torah states,] "This is the chok of the Torah." - The soton and the nations of the world afflict the Jewish people saying, "What is this mitzva? What reason is there in it?" Therefore He wrote by [this mitzva] "chuka" - it is a decree from before Me; you do not have authority to question it.

Maimonides
(traditional depiction)

It is important to understand that the chukim are not truly irrational commands, but simply commands that we are not able to understand due, as Maimonides puts it (Guide for the Perplexed III:26 - Friedlander translation), "either to the deficiency of our knowledge or the weakness of our intellect." As Maimonides states further:

[T]here is a cause for every commandment: every positive or negative precept serves a useful object; in some cases the usefulness is evident, e.g., the prohibition of murder and theft; in others the usefulness is not so evident, e.g., the prohibition of enjoying the fruit of a tree in the first three years (Lev. xix. 73), or of a vineyard in which other seeds have been growing (Deut. xxii. 9). Those commandments, whose object is generally evident, are called "judgments" (mishpatim); those whose object is not generally clear are called "ordinances" (hukkim). Thus they say [in reference to the words of Moses]: Ki lo dabar rek hu mi-kem (lit." for it is not a vain thing for you," Deut. xxxii. 74); "It is not in vain, and if it is in vain, it is only so through you." That is to say, the giving of these commandments is not a vain thing and without any useful object; and if it appears so to you in any commandment, it is owing to the deficiency in your comprehension. You certainly know the famous saying that Solomon knew the reason for all commandments except that of the "red heifer."

All of the mitzvos have reasons, however their reasons are not always known to us. In some cases, such as the para aduma, the mitzva may even appear fundamentally illogical. The chok therefore represents the essence of lishma - the performance of the commandments for their own sake, as Divine commands. By a chok one does not know what purpose is served by the command, one performs the command simply because God has commanded it.

R' Samson Raphael Hirsch

Ultimately, this principle applies to all the mitzvos. Even with regard to the mishpatim, which we are able to explain, our fundamental obligation to obey the mitzva is rooted not in the fact that the mitzva happens to correspond with what we believe to be morally obligatory, but in the fact that it is a Divine command. As R' Samson Raphael Hirsch (d.1888) writes in his foreword to Horeb:

It is commandment, the command of God, that constitutes duty for the Israelite, and the will of God that is the sole basis of all our duties. ... God's command... constitutes duty for us, and God's will is the only basis on which our obligation rests. ...

Even, therefore, if every Divine precept were a riddle to us and presented us with a thousand unsolved and insoluble problems, the obligatory character of the commandments would not in the slightest degree be impaired by this. Whatever command or prohibition of God it may be that prompts one to ask why one should do this and not do that, there is but one and the same answer: Because it is the will of God, and it is your duty to be the servant of God with all your powers and resources and with every breath of your life.

This answer is not only adequate; it is essentially the only one possible, and it would remain so if we were ourselves able to penetrate into the reason for every commandment, or if God Himself had disclosed to us the reasons for His commandments. We should have to perform them, not because there was such-and-such a reason for any commandment, but because God had ordained it. ...

The Jew who sincerely carries out and observes [the] commandment[s] with the simple idea, which everyone can grasp, that he is thereby performing God's will and so fulfilling his vocation as a man and an Israelite, is, in the complete sense of the term, a Jew and a servant of God, even though he has never unravelled the significance or perceived the connection of the parts of any one of all the Divine commandments. Such a Jew has attained to the highest bliss of earthly life. For the man of pure heart there is no higher or more holy consciousness than that of having fulfilled the Divine will.

R' Yechiel Michel Epstein
The Aruch HaShulchan

Similarly, R' Yechiel Michel Epstein (d.1908), in his Aruch HaShulchan (יורה דעה רמ:ב), writes with regard to the mitzva of honoring one's parents:

כיבוד אב ואם היא מהמצוות השכליות ונתפשטה בכל אום ולשון וגם הכופרים בתורה נזהרים בה מפני השכל והטבע. ואנחנו עמב"י נצטוינו על כל מצוה שכליות לבלי לעשותה מפני השכל אלא מפני ציוי הקב"ה בתורתו הקדושה. ועל זה נאמר, "והיה עקב תשמעון את המשפטים האלה וגו'." דמקודם כתיב, "ושמרת את החוקים ואת המשפטים וגו'," ולזה אומר, "והיה עקב תשמעון את המשפטים האלה," כלומר דהחוקים וודאי תעשו מפני שאתם שומעים לקולי, אבל עיקר השכר הוא שגם המשפטים - שהם המצות השכליות - תעשו מפני השמיעה, כלומר מפני שאני מצוה אתכם ולא מפני השכל. וזהו שאמר דוד, "מגיד דבריו ליעקב חוקיו ומשפטיו לישראל." וזהו עיקר גדול במצות התורה.

The mitzva of honoring one's father and mother is one of the mitzvos sichliyos (rationally comprehensible commandments) and it is found among all nations and peoples. Even those who deny the Torah are careful to uphold this obligation due to its rationality and because of human nature. However, we, the Jewish people, are commanded with regard to all the mitzvos sichliyos not to fulfill them due to their rationality, but because God has commanded us to do so in His holy Torah. It is in this regard that the Torah (Deut. 7:12) states, "And it shall be, if you listen to to these mishpatim..." [thatGod will bless you]. For immediately before, the Torah writes, "And you shall keep [the commandment,] the chukim and the mishpatim...", and it is in this regard that the Torah says [the promise of reward] "And it shall be, if you listen to to these mishpatim." [God is] saying that, by the chukim, it is certain that you are doing them [only] because you are listening to My voice, but the primary merit is that also by the mishpatim - i.e. the mitzvos sichliyos - you should perform them because you are listening [to Me]. In other words, [you should do them] because I commanded you [to do so] and not because they are rational. This is what David said (Psalms 147:19), "He tells His word to Jacob, His chukim and mishpatim to Israel." This is a great principle of the mitzvos of the Torah.

(It isn't entirely clear how the Aruch HaShulchan sees this idea in Psalms 147:19. I believe his proof-text is based upon the context of the following verse which states "ומשפטים בל ידעום" - "and [the other nations] do not know the mishpatim." In other words, the non-Jewish nations do not truly know even the mishpatim, for, at best, they see them merely as human laws, and, all too often, they fail to recognize many of them at all. Whereas the Jewish people are not dependent upon their own reasoning to know the mishpatim, for they know them the same way they know the chukim, through God's revelation in His Torah.)

The function of the chukim is precisely to teach us this fundamental lesson. Thus, the classic Sefer HaChinuch (c.14th century), a work that enumerates and discusses each of the 613 commandments, refrains from his normal practice of giving a reason for the mitzva when he discusses the commandment of the para aduma (Mitzva 397). He writes:

אע"פ שמלאני לבבי לכתב רמזים מטעמי המצוות שקדמו על צד הפשט, עם ההתנצלות שהמלאכה לחנך בה בני והנערים חבריו, במצוה זו רפו ידי ואירא לפצות פי עליה כלל גם בפשט, כי ראיתי לרז"ל האריכו הדיבור בעומק סודה וגודל ענינה, עד שאמרו שהמלך שלמה השיג לדעת בריבוי חכמתו כל טעמי התורה חוץ מזו, שאמר עליה, "אמרתי אחכמה והיא רחוקה ממני." גם אמרו במדרש רבי תנחומא: רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא אומר, אמר לו הקב"ה למשה, לך אני מגלה טעם פרה ולא לאחרים. וכיוצא באלו הדברים רבים.

Although I have been so presumptuous as to write hints of the simpler reasons for the previous mitzvos, with the justification that the task [of this work] is to educate my son and his young friends, with regard to this mitzva my hands become weak and I am afraid to open my mouth even to give the simplest explanation of it. For I have seen how the Sages speak at length of the depth of its mystery and its great significance, to the point that they say that King Solomon, with his abundant wisdom, was able to grasp the reasons of all the commandments except this one, about which he said, "I said I will be wise but it is far from me." (Ecclesiastes 7:23) The Sages also say, in the medrash of Rabbi Tanchuma: Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Chanina says, God said to Moses: To you I will reveal the reason for the para [aduma], but not to others. And there are many similar statements.

R' Yaakov Kamenetzky

R' Yaakov Kamenetzky (d.1986) points out (אמת ליעקב עה"ת) that the Chinuch certainly would never claim that the various reasons he gives for the mitzvos are the final and comprehensive reasons for the commandments. They are simply his own insights, given to help his fellow Jews derive moral lessons from the mitzvos. If so, R' Yaakov asks, why did he feel that he had to refrain from giving such a reason for para aduma? Because, R' Yaakov answers, by para aduma the mystery is itself the primary function of the mitzva. Despite whatever insights one might be able to give into the meaning of the para aduma, in the final analysis its main function is to teach us that we must obey God's commands even when we are unable to understand them.

The truth is that the distinction between the mishpatim and the chukim is far from simple. We live in a world where even the most "obvious" of the mishpatim are no longer self-evident. Many of the laws against sexual immorality are now seen by many supposedly educated and civilized people as irrational and even immoral. Even the "ultimate" rational law, the prohibition against murder, is no longer unambiguously obvious to many apparently civilized people in the world today. Thus the philosopher, Peter Singer, who is widely considered one of the most influential philosophers alive today and whose books are required reading in many university courses, has argued in favor of broadly expanding the legality of euthanasia and infanticide (no, not abortion). There is no immoral act that human beings cannot justify to themselves if they wish to do so. What seems like a mishpat in one society, may well seem like a chok in another. Ultimately, our commitment to the mitzvos must be based on our belief in the Divine origin of the Torah, and our obligation to obey God's will as expressed in His Torah.

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Korach - Dealing with Machlokes

The Chofetz Chaim

The Chofetz Chaim (R' Yisrael Meir Kagan d.1933) used to tell a story (recorded in ספר חפץ חיים עה"ת on Parshas Korach) about a machlokes - a dispute - that broke out in a small town between a resident and the head of the community. The machlokes deteriorated to the point that the resident threatened to inform on the head of the community to the government about various illegalities he was involved in. When the resident's wife learned of this, she tried to convince him not to do so, pointing out that the head of the community had been responsible for freeing their own sons from the draft. (Referring to the infamous Cantonist decrees of 19th century Russia.) "If they investigate him," argued the wife, "they will also arrest our sons!" The husband replied, "It is worth it! It is worth it for all of us to be imprisoned, as long as we can lower him from his position!"

The Chofetz Chaim pointed out that once a person is involved in a machlokes, there is no telling where it may end.

The incident with Korach in this week's parsha is the classic case of machlokes. Although he was one of the greatest men of his generation, Korach's desire for honor and his jealousy of Moses and Aaron led him entirely off the proper path. His name is now used to epitomize the baal machlokes (disputatious person) to the degree that the mitzva to avoid machlokes is "לא יהיה כקרח ועדתו" - "Do not be like Korach and his congregation" (Numbers 17:5 - Talmud, Sanhedrin 110a).

In Pirkei Avos (5:17) we learn:

כל מחלוקת שהיא לשם שמים סופה להתקיים, ושאינה לשם שמים אין סופה להתקיים. איזו היא מחלוקת שהוא לשם שמים - זו מחלוקת הלל ושמאי, ושאינו לשם שמים - זו מחלוקת קרח וכל עדתו

Any machlokes which is for the sake of Heaven, "its end will be upheld," and a machlokes that is not for the sake of heaven, "its end will not be upheld." What is a a machlokes that is for the sake of Heaven? This is the machlokes of Hillel and Shamai. What is a machlokes that is not for the sake of Heaven? This is the machlokes of Korach and all his congregation.

Here we find that the Sages made a critical distinction between two kinds of machlokes, "for the sake of Heaven" and "not for the sake of Heaven." However, there are a number of aspects of this mishna that need to be explained. Most importantly, what exactly is the difference between these two categories?

The commentaries explain that the essence of machlokes for the sake of Heaven is a dispute in which all the disputants are motivated by the commitment to determine the true will of God as expressed in His Torah. While they may disagree about the details, the core motivation of both sides is identical. This is the kind of dispute we find throughout the Talmud and traditional literature, and it is exemplified by the famous disputes between the great Talmudic sages Hillel and Shamai.

The Baal Shem Tov, R' Yisrael Baal Shem (d.1760) (ספר הבעש"ט - ואתחנן מט) made an analogy to a group of architects who were appointed to design a palace for the king. The architects met to begin their plans and they began to disagree. Each one had a different idea as to what would make a more beautiful palace. Even though they are in disagreement about the details of the palace, their basic goals and motivation are identical. Each one seeks to express his love and respect for the king in the best possible way.

Similarly, taught the Baal Shem Tov, when Torah scholars argue for the sake of Heaven, as we find in the Talmud, their disagreement is only on the details of how to serve God properly, but their basic values and motivations are the same.

This idea can help us understand the famous Talmudic passage (Kiddushin 30b):

א"ר חייא בר אבא, אפי' האב ובנו, הרב ותלמידו, שעוסקים בתורה בשער אחד, נעשים אויבים זה את זה ואינם זזים משם עד שנעשים אוהבים זה את זה

R' Chiya bar Abba said, Even a father and son [or] a rebbi and disciple who study Torah at together (literally, "in one gate") become enemies of each other but they do not move from there until they love each other.

Initially, when a dispute in Torah study begins, each one sees the other's approach as improper. However, as the discussion continues and each one comes to understand the other's perspective and reasoning, they recognize that the disagreement is not rooted in a rejection of their most basic values, but only on the details of their application. Thus, their love is rekindled even stronger than before. (See the עץ יוסף there in the עין יעקב who gives a mashal from the עקדה that is very similar to the mashal quoted above from the Baal Shem Tov.)

The Sheivet Mussar (R' Eliyahu of Smyrna, d.1729) (37:48) comments similarly on the famous Talmudic passage (Brachos 64a), תלמידי חכמים מרבים שלום בעולם - "Torah scholars cause peace to increase in the world":

והנה אע"פ שלעיני הרואים נראה כמחזיקים במחלקת בהיותם נלחמים זה עם זה בהלכה... אדרבה מחלקת זה אינו אלא שלום

Behold, even though to the observer it seems as if [the Torah scholars] are engaging in machlokes in their disputes with each other on the law... on the contrary, such machlokes is nothing but peace!

While the Sheivet Mussar explains this idea in rather esoteric kabbalistic terms, the basic idea is clear. Whatever the disagreements may be between Torah scholars, they are rooted in core values that are not in dispute at all. The love of God, the commitment to obey His will as expressed in the Torah, and the commitment to absolute truth in the pursuit of those goals - these are held to by both sides and, when all is said and done, it is these values that really matter. The machlokes of the Sages is only on the surface, but with regard to the most basic and central issues they are entirely בשלום - at peace. Indeed, the very passion with which each side argues for its position and attacks the others testifies to their commitment to these shared values.

This principle, that machlokes for the sake of Heaven refers to machlokes where both sides are seeking the same goal of truth, helps us understand the odd language used by the mishna, "כל מחלוקת שהיא לשם שמים סופה להתקיים" - "Any machlokes which is for the sake of Heaven, 'its end will be upheld.'" What does the mishna mean by "סופה להתקיים" - "its end will be upheld"? Many commentaries explain this to mean that the true goal - the "end" for which both sides are striving - will be upheld. Thus the Bartenura (commentary on the mishna written by R' Ovadia m'Bartenura, d.1515) writes:

ואני שמעתי פירוש 'סופה' - תכליתה המבוקש מענינה. והמחלוקת שהיא לשם שמים, התכלית והסוף המבוקש מאותה מחלוקת להשיג האמת, וזה מתקיים, כמו שאמרו, "מתוך הויכוח יתברר האמת," וכמו שנתבאר במחלוקת הלל ושמאי, שהלכה כבית הלל. ומחלוקת שאינה לשם שמים, תכלית הנרצה בה היא בקשת השררה ואהבת הניצוח, וזה הסוף אינו מתקיים, כמו שמצינו במחלוקת קורח ועדתו שתכלית וסוף כוונתם היתה בקשת הכבוד והשררה והיה להיפך

I have heard explained that "its end" refers to the purpose that was sought from [the machlokes]. In a machlokes for the sake of Heaven, the purpose and the end that is sought in the machlokes is to know the truth, and this purpose will be upheld, as is said, "Out of debate the truth is made clear." As it is was clarified by the the machlokes of Hillel and Shamai that the law is like the academy of Hillel.

But by a machlokes that is not for the sake of Heaven, the desired purpose is the pursuit of power and the love of victory. This purpose will not be upheld, as we find by the machlokes of Korach and his congregation. Their goal was the pursuit of honor and power and in the end they found the opposite.

The Talmud (Eiruvin 14b) discusses why the law followed the opinion of the academy of Hillel:

מפני מה זכו בית הלל לקבוע הלכה כדבריהם? מפני שהיו שונים דבריהם ודברי בית שמאי, ולא עוד אלא שהיו מקדימין דברי בית שמאי לדבריהם

Why did the academy of Hillel merit that the law should be according to their words? Because they would study their own words as well as the words of the academy of Shamai. Moreover, they would study the words of the academy of Shamai before they studied their own!

R' Chaim Shmulevitz

R' Chaim Shmulevitz (d.1979) points out (שיחות מוסר תשל"ב - מאמר ל"ג) that this demonstrated that the academy of Hillel was devoted purely to knowing the truth to an even greater degree than the academy of Shamai. Because of their complete devotion to knowing the truth, they merited to be the dominant opinion.

The great sages Hillel and Shamai epitomize machlokes for the sake of Heaven, where the goal of both sides is purely to determine the truth. Korach and his congregation epitomize the opposite, a machlokes not for the sake of Heaven, but for selfish purposes, motivated by jealousy, pride, and the desire for honor. Such machlokes, asides from being a sin in its own right, also paves the path towards many more sins, ranging from lashon hara (gossip and tale-bearing) and leitzanus (mockery) to the extremes of physical strife and even murder. The spiritual harm caused by machlokes is immense for it causes the Shechina (Divine Presence) to depart from our midst. R' Chaim Shmulevitz says:

כמה קשה המחלוקת, שראינו כמה ישיבות קדושות שהחזיקו מעמד במצבים קשים ביותר ולא נחרבו אלא על ידי מחלוקת. ואף על פי שבית המדרש הריהו מקדש מעט שהשכינה שורה שם... אבל על ידי המחלוקת השכינה מסתלקת ונעשה ח"ו "ביתו" של השטן

How harsh is machlokes! For we have seen many holy yeshivos that continued to function even in the most difficult of circumstances, and they were destroyed in the end only by machlokes. Even though the beis medrash (Torah study hall) is a miniature Mikdash (Holy Temple) in which the Shechina rests... but machlokes causes the Shechina to depart and it becomes, God forbid, a "house" of the soton.

Knowing all this, we must still bear in mind that Korach and his congregation were men of great stature. While it is very easy for us to talk about the evils of machlokes in theory, in practice it tends not to be so simple. Whenever there is a machlokes, the instigators always claim to be acting for the sake of Heaven. This was certainly true of Korach. So how is the ordinary person to distinguish between a true machlokes for the sake of Heaven and one that is not actually for the sake of Heaven?

Indeed, one of the more disconcerting aspects that arises from the story of the dispute is that Korach apparently believed that he was in the right and that, when they all came before God with their burning incense, God Himself would chose him as the high priest. This tells us that not only can it be difficult for an outside observer to know if a machlokes is truly for the sake of Heaven, but it can even be difficult for the leader of the machlokes to recognize this! These signs are therefore vitally important not for judging others, but for assessing ourselves.

One method is alluded to in the mishna. When the mishna gives an example of a machlokes for the sake of Heaven, it refers to Hillel and Shamai, the two opposing sides in the machlokes. When the mishna gives an example of a machlokes that is not for the sake of Heaven, however, it identifies "Korach and his congregation," which was only one side in the dispute. On the simplest level, this is because, while Korach and his congregation instigated the machlokes against Moses and Aaron for their own selfish purposes, Moses and Aaron acted purely for the sake of Heaven. 

However, a number of commentators (עץ יוסף, עקבי  הצאן, מלבי"ם) see in this an additional lesson. When Korach and his congregation began their machlokes, each one of them was motivated by his own selfish purposes. Their alliance with the others was purely one of convenience, to enable each of them to achieve his own goals. Ultimately, each of them really wanted to gain power exclusively for himself. Thus, when Moses told them that each claimant to the high priesthood would burn incense and God would choose the one who was worthy, Korach correctly understood this to mean that only one of them would survive (רש"י טז:ז). Yet, this did not bother Korach, because Korach did not care a whit about "his congregation". They were nothing more than a tool for Korach to use. Thus, not only was there discord between the two ostensible sides of the machlokes, but there was also discord within the camp of Korach and his congregation. They too were not truly at peace with each other. This is a sign that the machlokes is not truly for the sake of Heaven.

Another way to assess if a machlokes is truly for the sake of Heaven is discussed by R' Yonason Eibschutz (d.1764) in his Yaaros Devash (vol. 2, p.135b). R' Yonason  Eibschutz says that the Sages referred to Hillel and Shamai together to give us a sign by which to distinguish between a true machlokes for the sake of Heaven and a machlokes that is not for the sake of Heaven:

אי המחולקים ובעלי ריבוח הם זולת הדבר שחלקו בו ומנגדים זה לזה הם אוהבים גמורים בלב ונפש זהו אות שמחלוקחם לש״ש אבל אם אויבים ונוטרים שנאה זה לזה על ידי מחלוקת זהו שלא לש״ש ויתיצב השטן בתוכם

If the disputants, asides from the specific issue in which they disagree, love each other completely, heart and soul, this is a sign that their machlokes is for the sake of Heaven. However, if they are enemies and hold hatred towards each other, then this is not a machlokes for the sake of Heaven and the soton stands among them.

The disagreements of Hillel and Shamai never impacted upon their love and respect for each other. This is a sign that their disputes were motivated purely for the sake of Heaven. If however, the machlokes leads the disputants to express hatred towards their opponents, as we find by Korach and his congregation, then this is a sign that the machlokes is not for the sake of Heaven.

In general, one of the most reliable ways to know if a machlokes is truly for the sake of Heaven is to look at the methods used by the disputants. By Korach we find that he made use of a wide range of "dirty tricks" to achieve his goals. He engaged in the worst forms of lashon hara and motzi shem ra (libelous gossip and tale-bearing), accusing Moses of being a power-hungry egomaniac and even of immoral behavior (Talmud Sanhedrin 110a - חשדוהו באשת איש). We also find that he made use of leitzanus (mockery) in his attacks on the Torah (such as his mockery of the laws of tzitzis and mezuzah) and of chanufa (flattery) and other forms of bribery in his appeals to the people.

However, in the end, the best advice when faced with a machlokes is, if at all possible, to simply not get involved. As the Talmud states (Chullin 89a):

א"ר אילעא, אין העולם מתקיים אלא בשביל מי שבולם את עצמו בשעת מריבה...

R' Ilaah said, The world survives only for the sake of those who silence themselves at a time of strife...

R' Samson Raphael Hirsch

In Proverbs we read (26:17), מחזיק באזני כלב עבר מתעבר על ריב לא לו - "Like one who grasps the ears of a dog, is one who gets angry over a quarrel that is not his." R' Samson Raphael Hirsch explains (From the Wisdom of Mishlé, ch.11):

Disputes are compared to biting animals. Do not meddle if a quarrel does not concern you. If you mix in, you are (as it were) grasping the ear of a biting animal: it will let go of its previous adversary and direct its attacks at you. (וכן פירש רש"י והגר"א)

This, in essence, was the advice that On ben Peles received from his wife that saved him from being destroyed along with Korach and his congregation. Even though On was initially one of Korach's supporters, as we see in the opening verse of the parsha (16:1), we find that he is not mentioned again. The Talmud  (Sanhedrin 109b) explains:

אמר רב, און בן פלת אשתו הצילתו. אמרה ליה, מאי נפקא לך מינה? אי מר רבה אנת תלמידא, ואי מר רבה אנת תלמידא!

Rav said, On ben Peles was saved by his wife. She said to him, "What are you going to get out of this? If he is the master you will be the disciple, and if he is the master you will be the disciple!"

The Sages praise the advice of On's wife very highly, applying to her the verse from Proverbs (14:1), חכמות נשים בנתה ביתה - "The wisest of women builds her house." Sometimes the greatest wisdom is also the simplest. While On almost certainly believed, at least initially, that he was supporting the right side in the fight, his wife was wiser than he. "This is not your fight! Stay out of it!" With this advice On's wife saved her husband and her family from the fate of Korach and his congregation.

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Bamidbar - Everything Has Its Place

In Parshas Bamidbar we read of how God chose the tribe of Levi to be His, to a degree above and beyond the rest of the Jewish people. Originally, the Temple service was to have been performed by the first-born sons of the entire nation. When the people sinned with the golden calf, they lost this privilege and it was given to the tribe of Levi. The tribe of Levi was chosen because, at the time of the sin of the golden calf, they answered Moses' cry of "Whoever is for God, to me!" and took up their swords to punish the worshippers of the calf.

In his commentary on Bamidbar, Rav Avigdor Miller notes a surprising irony in this. At the end of his life, Jacob admonished his sons Shimon and Levi for the violent manner in which they avenged the honor of their sister, Dinah. Yet now the descendants of Levi were being rewarded for engaging in a violent battle against their fellow Jews!

Rav Miller explains that this teaches us an important lesson:

...we learn that no natural emotion or character-trait is intrinsically evil: "God made the Man right" (Koheles 7:29), but good or evil depends on the manner in which these emotions and character-traits are exercised. Anger and even cruelty, jealousy and ambition, indulgence and temperance, indolence and alacrity: each has its proper place, and when employed in Hashem's service all of these motivations gain recompense in this life and everlasting reward in the Afterlife. The anger which endangered Jacob's family was cursed and was punished by landlessness, but when the anger was utilized to combat idolatry it was rewarded by an eternal covenant: "The Levites shall be Mine."

This is an important lesson as we come into Shavuos, the festival of Matan Torah (the Giving of the Torah). One of the most basic messages of the Torah is that every aspect of human life has the potential for holiness. Judaism teaches us not to reject our natural drives and desires, but to channel them into the service of God. This is one of the basic symbolic messages of circumcision, which the Jewish people had to undergo before they could receive the Torah, and which every male convert must undergo to enter into the Jewish covenant with God. As Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch writes (Collected Writings III, pp. 78-79 - emphasis added):

All the physical aspects of of our earthly existence, with all its impulses and forces, its riches and pleasures, must be brought under the firm control of the holy will of God. This sign [of circumcision] poses, as the first and indispensable condition for our covenant with God that we must circumcise the ערלה [uncontrolled nature (lit. "foreskin)] of the physical aspect of our body. It is not the consecration of the spirit but the consecration of the body that marks the entry into the covenant of Abraham. This covenant categorically rejects the erroneous concepts of both extremes. It does not condone a mortification of the flesh one earth for the purpose of gaining life in the world to come. But it also rejects the worship of physical appetites and the cult of "beautiful" sensualism.

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Explaining the Torah in Seventy "Languages"

Just finished studying with my Torah Mate. We recently began studying Chumash Devarim with Rashi and Gur Aryeh (the Maharal's super-commentary on Rashi) and we came to Deuteronomy 1:5, "On the other side of the Jordan in the land of Moab, Moses began clarifying this Torah, saying:" On the words "clarifying the Torah" Rashi comments (based on Medrash Tanchuma), "בשבעים לשון פרשה להם" - "He explained it to them in seventy languages."

This comment obviously needs explanation. Is it plausible that Moses actually got up and orally presented the Torah to the Jewish people in seventy different languages? How many languages did the Jewish people speak? Did Moshe get up and "explain the Torah" to them in languages that none of them understood? For that matter, the word used by Rashi is "פרשה" - "explained" - not translate!

So we started looking around. My chavrusa reminded me of the discussion of languages in Genesis 10:5, which, in turn, led us to look at the story of the Tower of Babel, in Genesis 11. One thing we noticed immediately is that, in the entire story of the confusion of the languages in Genesis 11, the Hebrew word "לשון"  (lit. "tongue") is never used (unlike in Genesis 10:5). Instead, the word used for language in Genesis 11 is "שפה" (lit. "lip"). Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch, in his commentary on Genesis 10:5, and again on 11:1, writes that the word "שפה" designates actual language, whereas "לשון" refers to dialect.

This was useful, in that it at least showed us that the "שבעים לשון" - "seventy languages" - mentioned by Rashi need not refer to seventy distinct languages. However, it didn't really make much sense to say that he explained it to them in seventy different dialects either.

At this point, both of us were already thinking that these "seventy languages" probably were not "languages" at all, but seventy different modes of interpretation, related to the famous concept of "שבעים פנים לתורה" - "there are seventy facets to the Torah." But we were hesitant to give such an explanation on our own, without some support. Baruch Hashem, we found exactly what we were looking for in the commentary HaKesav VeHaKabbala (by Rabbi Yakov Tzvi Mecklenburg, d.1865):

Rashi, from the Sages, says, "He explained it to them in seventy languages." They don't mean foreign languages, for what benefit would that be to the Jews? ... Rather, it is the way of the Sages to refer to the intent of a statement by the term לשון..., and so here, with the "seventy languages", it means "seventy intended meanings", similar to the statement of the Sages elsewhere, "שבעים פנים לתורה" - "there are seventy facets to the Torah" - which refers to the inner intended meanings of the Torah, asides from the initial, simple meaning.

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The Miracles - and Lessons - of Chanuka

While there are a number of historical sources for the events surrounding the Jewish rebellion against the Syrian Greek empire, there are only two sources that can be said to have any kind of canonical authority in Judaism. These sources are the Talmud and the Siddur (Jewish prayer book). The Talmud (Shabbos 21b) states:

מאי חנוכה? דתנו רבנן: בכ"ה בכסליו יומי דחנוכה תמניא אינון, דלא למספד בהון ודלא להתענות בהון. שכשנכנסו יוונים להיכל טמאו כל השמנים שבהיכל, וכשגברה מלכות בית חשמונאי ונצחום, בדקו ולא מצאו אלא פך אחד של שמן שהיה מונח בחותמו של כהן גדול, ולא היה בו אלא להדליק יום אחד, נעשה בו נס והדליקו ממנו שמונה ימים. לשנה אחרת קבעום ועשאום ימים טובים בהלל והודאה

What is [the miracle of] Chanukah? The Rabbis taught (in a braisa from Megilas Taanis): On the 25^th of Kislev, there are eight days of Chanukah, in which we do not eulogize nor fast. For when the Greeks entered the Temple, they rendered all the oils in the Temple tamei, and when the kingdom of the house of Chasmonai (the Hasmoneans) became strong and was victorious over them, they searched and they found only one vessel of oil that had been placed with the seal of the kohein gadol and it only contained enough to light for one day. A miracle happened with it and they lit from it for eight days. The following year they established and made these days into festivals with Hallel and thanksgiving.

The Talmud seems to indicate that the holiday of Chanukah was established in memory of the miracle of the oil. And, as we all know, on Chanukah we light the menorah in memory of this miracle. However, if we look at our second source, the Al HaNisim prayer that is inserted into our prayers on Chanukah, we find something strange. The prayer reads:

[We thank You, God,] for the miracles, the redemptions, the mighty deeds, the salvations, the wondrous deeds, the consolations, and the wars which You performed for our fathers in those days, at this time.

In the days of Mattisyahu, son of Yochanan Kohein Gadol, the Chashmonai, and his sons, when the evil Greek kingdom rose against Your nation Israel to make them forget Your Torah and to remove them from the laws of Your will. You, in Your abundant mercy, stood for them in their time of oppression, You fought their fight, You judged their case, and You avenged their revenge. You delivered the strong into the hands of the weak, the numerous into the hands of the few, the impure into the hands of the pure, the evil into the hands of the righteous, and the wicked into the hands of the students of Your Torah. You made a great and holy name for Yourself in Your world, and You did a great salvation and redemption for Your nation, Israel, as [clear as] this very day. After this Your children came to the Holy of Holies of Your House, and they cleaned Your Temple, purified Your Holy Place, and lit candles in the courtyards of our holiness. And they established these eight days to give thanks and praise to Your great Name.

In the entire prayer, the miracle of the oil is not mentioned. If the miracle of the oil was the primary miracle of Chanukah, which the Talmud seems to indicate, then why don't we mention it in our prayers?

To answer this question we need to first deal with another question, and that is, why was the miracle of the oil necessary at all? One of the famous questions asked about Chanukah is that if the reason we celebrate Chanukah for eight days is because the miracle of the oil lasted eight days, then really we should only celebrate seven days, as the first day was not a miracle since there was already enough oil for one day. There are many answers to this question. One of the answers that some authorities, such as the Meiri, suggest is that the very fact that they were able to find one container of pure oil in the first place was a miracle. The concept of ritual purity was deeply offensive to the Hellenistic mind, especially to those Jews who had abandoned Judaism in favor of Hellenism. It had been no accident that the Greeks had “rendered all the oils impure” (as stated in the poem, Maoz Tzur) but a deliberate act. The Greeks had searched the temple very carefully to render impure all the oil, and finding even one container was itself a miracle.

This, then, raises a question; why did God need to violate the laws of nature to make the oil burn for eight days, when He could have made a "simpler" miracle that the Jews would find eight containers? We know that, in truth, there is no distinction between "nature" and the miraculous; that both are entirely the expression of God's Will. However, in general, God desires that the world follow the natural laws that He established; that, of course, is why He established them. Whenever we find a miracle that violates the laws of nature, this indicates that God wishes to send us a special message that required the violation of His natural laws. What was God's message to us through the miracle of the oil?

All of our sources about the period, historical and traditional, tell us that the Jews of this period had been deeply affected by Greek thought. (The Jews were not unique in this regard.) The influence of Hellenism was not limited only to the outright Hellenizers, who had betrayed their people and had taken a major role in the oppression of their fellow Jews, but was pervasive throughout the culture in various degrees. One of the principles of Greek philosophy, as espoused by Aristotle, is that God does not take an active part in the affairs of the world. This idea had crept into the thoughts of many otherwise loyal Jews. Thus, even after the miraculous war that had just been fought, there were Jews who were unsure if the victories were really the result of Divine intervention, or simply the result of the brilliant strategies and tactics used by the Jewish leaders. The doubts of these Jews were put to rest by the miracle of the oil. Here was an undeniable miracle; one that broke the laws of nature! Obviously, God does intervene in this world, and clearly His hand was behind the entire Jewish victory.

The miracle of the oil had no great historical impact, in of itself. It won no battles, saved no lives, and only those who were directly involved in the temple service would have even been aware that it was happening. Nevertheless, the miracle of the oil was absolutely vital as a justification for the establishment of Chanukah as a Jewish holiday. If there had been only the miracle of the victory of the Jews over the Greeks, there was a risk that Chanukah would have been viewed as nothing more than a patriotic holiday—a sort of Jewish Fourth of July. It might deteriorate to nothing more than a celebration of Jewish military might and patriotism. However, with the miracle of the oil it became clear that Chanukah was not a celebration of military strength but of Divine salvation.

When we light the menorah to fulfill the requirement of pirsumei nisah—to spread knowledge of the miracle, we perform an act commemorating the miracle of the oil, a miracle which cannot be explained away as simply brilliant military leadership, or lucky coincidence.

R' Samson Raphael Hirsch

However, in our prayers we focus exclusively on the miracle of the victory of good over evil. We thank God for saving us from spiritual destruction, that the Torah and its commandments were not forgotten. That God guided the leaders of His people to victory over those who would forbid us from serving Him as we should. In our prayers we do not focus on the miracle of the oil, for in our prayers we express our recognition that there is no real distinction between the open miracle and the hidden miracle, that both are essentially the same. As Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch writes:

The very steadiness, the regularity, of the phenomena of nature is a much clearer, more wonderful manifestation of Divine wisdom and omnipotence than the suspension of these natural laws when God’s miracles were executed. In fact, the purpose of these special acts of God, which interrupted the regular order of nature, was to point to Him as the Lawgiver of these natural laws, lest the thought of Him as Regulator, Master and Lord of the world order be lost through the steady regularity of the natural phenomena. (Hirsch Siddur p. 23)

There are many lessons we learn from Chanukah. We learn that we must be willing to risk our lives for the observance of the God's commandments, we learn of the primary importance of Torah study, and we learn not to judge right and wrong from the standards of numbers and strength. However, perhaps the most basic lesson of Chanukah is to recognize that God's guiding hand is behind all events, even when His presence is not evident; that every aspect of life and history is a miracle.

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